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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the interaction between direct regula-
tion of pharmaceuticals under the Federal Food Drug and Cos-
metic Act (FDCA) and the indirect regulation of pharmaceuticals
provided by common law tort incentives. The Article concludes
that tort liability is generally inappropriate in cases where manufac-
turers have complied with the FDCA.
The Article begins with a description of the FDCA's operation,
and provides an overview of the Food and Drug Administration's
(FDA) role in the drug approval process and drug labeling. This
overview will demonstrate the need for centralized control over
drug labeling. Moreover, we will provide an explanation of the
costs and benefits of the drug approval process.
Next, we will focus on the regulatory effects of tort law from an
economics perspective. The role of tort law in deterring inefficient
accidents depends on the extent and stringency of government
regulation. We will examine the sufficiency of regulatory deter-
rence under various regulatory schemes, including the FDCA. This
economic analysis will demonstrate that tort law's applicability
should be limited to those regulatory schemes that inadequately
deter risks. Since the FDCA adequately deters risk, the proper role
for tort law should be to provide incentives for ensuring regulatory
compliance.
We then provide a critical review of the legal rules applied to
[Vol. 24:14371438
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pharmaceutical litigation in American courts. The uncertainty
present in current pharmaceutical litigation stems largely from the
failure to adopt regulatory compliance in a strict liability world.
Examination of labeling litigation suggests that courts have yet to
establish meaningful standards. In addition, design defect litiga-
tion, by protecting only those drugs without side-effects, leads to
untoward consequences. Furthermore, the tort system has a pro-
pensity for error. Our current litigation system generates perverse
incentives, which we document.
Finally, we conclude that because of the strict nature of the
FDCA, the role of tort liability should be limited through federal
legislation.
II. REGULATORY OBjEcrIvEs OF THE FDCA
The regulatory objectives of the FDCA are to ensure that the
manufacturer shares all risk information with the FDA so that the
agency may make informed risk-benefitjudgments about the utility
of a pharmaceutical.' These judgments occur throughout the life
of the drug.' The agency determines which drugs reach the mar-
ket and the labeling for those that do.
A. Standardization of Drug Labeling
Drug labeling reduces the risk of drug-induced injury by in-
forming health care professionals of prescription medications' po-
tential adverse effects. 3 Because prescription drugs rarely can be
I The drug approval process is described infra at notes 22-38 and accompanying
text. The results of extensive clinical studies must be submitted to the FDA, which
then balances safety versus efficacy to determine whether the product should be ap-
proved. See Dixie Farley, Benefit vs. Risk: How MA Approves New Drugs, in FDA, FROM
TEST TUBE TO PATIENT: NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1988), re-
printed in PLI, BIOTECHNOLOGY- NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL POLICIES AND REGULA-
TIONS 164, 164 (1988).
Likewise, post-approval safety monitoring is described infra at notes 39-49 and
accompanying text.
2 The receipt of new safety information can lead the agency, after holding a hear-
ing, to withdraw approval for marketing of a drug. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e)(1) (1988); 21
C.F.R. § 5.82 (1993). The Secretary of Health and Human Services has authority to
order the withdrawal of marketing approval without a hearing where there appears to
be an "imminent hazard to public health," provided, however, that the manufacturer
receives an expedited post-withdrawal hearing. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1988).
3 "Few if any drugs are completely safe in the sense that they may be taken by all
persons in all circumstances without risk." United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544,
555 (1979). The FDCA defines a prescription drug as follows:
A drug intended for use by man-
... which because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect,
or the method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its use,
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said to present no potential risks, accurate and up-to-date informa-
tion about their risk potential is a critical determinant in the physi-
cian's choice of a patient's medication. An effective warnings
policy for risks must communicate with some degree of precision
the risk level presented by the product in general as well as for its
specific class of users.
Under the FDCA and its implementing regulations, the FDA
possesses virtually total control over the content of the package in-
serts that accompany all prescription drugs.4 Because the informa-
tion contained in the package inserts plays a critical role in
physicians' prescribing patterns, the package inserts must portray
the drug's safety profile with accuracy, balance, and brevity.' Given
these goals, the need for standardization is obvious.
An important function of the FDA is to ensure that risk infor-
mation is appropriately channelled. The FDCA and its implement-
ing regulations allow the FDA to perform this task in a relatively
straightforward manner. In particular, before permitting the sale
of a pharmaceutical product, the manufacturer is required to gen-
erate both safety and efficacy information and must present this
information to the FDA in a new drug application (NDA).6
is not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner li-
censed by law to administer such drug [and] ... shall be dispensed only
[upon prescription].
21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (1) (B) (1988).
4 Former FDA Chief Counsel Richard Cooper observed that, while a review of the
applicable law would lead to the conclusion that manufacturers can act contrary to
the FDA's will, the "FDA . . . retains, as a practical matter, complete control over
package inserts." Richard M. Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products Liability: The Role of
the Food and Drug Administration, 41 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 233, 236 (1986).
5 In other words, the "statutory scheme for drug labeling is intended to provide
physicians, in straightforward and concise terms, with the information they need to
prescribe a drug under conditions that maximize the drug's effectiveness and mini-
mize its risks." 44 Fed. Reg. 37,436 (1979).
6 Under the FDCA, the manufacturer must submit an NDA to the agency and
receive pre-marketing approval in order to market a "new drug," i.e., any drug that is
"not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experi-
ence to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use
under the condition prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof."
21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (1988). If the manufacturer of a "new drug" wishes to dis-
tribute it lawfully, he can submit an NDA in conformance with 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)
(1988). Approval for marketing can be obtained only if, inter alia, the applicant sub-
mits "adequate and well-controlled studies" demonstrating safety and efficacy. Id.
§ 355(d). Alternatively, the manufacturer can claim that the product is not a "new
drug" because it is "generally recognized" as being "safe and effective" for its intended
uses. Id. § 321(p) (1) & (2). Courts have, however, construed such general recogni-
tion to be based on the same adequate and well-controlled investigations required for
approval of an NDA under 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 653 (1973).
1440
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The NDA process requires the pharmaceutical manufacturer
to submit proposed labeling for the drug.7 The FDA and the man-
ufacturer then generate the drug's initial label based on the manu-
facturer-supplied information concerning the drug's safety and
efficacy.' If the FDA approves the NDA and licenses the drug for
sale, the manufacturer has a continuing obligation to report safety-
related information to the agency.9 Drug product labeling often
changes over time as a result of the FDA receiving information
from the manufacturer or other sources about a drug's safety in
the marketplace.' °
The FDA has adopted a standardized warning vocabulary and
structure to ensure that safety information is readily accessible to
health care professionals. 1 Each section of drug labeling ad-
dresses a specific set of issues. The first section of labeling provides
a general "description" of the product. 2 The second deals with
the drug's "clinical pharmacology," discussing issues about how the
pharmaceutical operates.'" Drug labeling's third component con-
sists of "indications and usage," so that the particular situations in
which the medicine has been shown to be effective are summa-
rized.' 4 The "contraindications" section addresses situations in
which the drug should not be administered because of particular-
ized, severe risks.'5 The "warnings" section is devoted to serious
risks that arise both generally and in particularized contexts. 6
Risks that arise less frequently are addressed in the "precautions"
section of the label.' 7 The potential for untoward reactions that
7 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1) (F) (1988).
8 Although the manufacturer submits proposed initial labeling with the NDA, the
actual labeling is often the result of negotiations between the FDA and the manufac-
turer. The agency's power to disapprove the NDA ensures that it retains practical
control over the contents of drug labeling.
9 The post-marketing requirements are set forth in 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (1993).
10 New technology has decreased the amount of time required to inform the physi-
cian of changed labeling. In particular, the Physicians' Desk Reference (PDR) has for
decades provided the medical profession with an annual compendium of current
package inserts supplemented with frequent pocket parts. As with legal publishing,
the PDR's publisher has gone on-line, thereby reducing the time required for new
information to reach the prescribing physician.
11 The FDA has explicitly recognized the need for uniformity in drug labeling. See,
e.g., 50 Fed. Reg. 51,403 (1985) (citing the potential for confusing or misleading con-
sumers, the proposed rule recognized that the "FDA has a well-established policy of
promoting uniformity in the area of labeling").
12 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(a) (1993).
13 Id. § 201.57(b).
14 Id. § 201.57(c).
15 Id. § 201.57(d).
16 Id. § 201.57(e).
17 Id. § 201.57(f).
1994] 1441
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may occur on a random basis is addressed in the "adverse reac-
tions" section."8 Subsequent to receiving this comprehensive col-
lection of risk information, the physician is advised about the
appropriate "dosage and administration" of the drug product.19
The uniform structure of drug labeling has important implica-
tions for the processing of information. This standardized format
significantly assists risk information processing. A physician look-
ing for such information will know where to locate it.20 Likewise,
the regulatory process and institutional memory also ensure that
the language used in drug labeling is consistent and appropriate to
the degree of known risks posed by the drug. The FDA's central
control over labeling results in a uniformity of language that could
not occur through a more decentralized form of regulation. The
result of FDA superintendence is that drug labeling tends to pro-
duce its intended impact. 21
B. The Drug Approval Process: Risk-Benefit Analysis
As noted, to obtain FDA approval for marketing a prescription
drug, a pharmaceutical applicant must generate substantial pre-
18 Id. § 2 01.5 7 (g).
19 Id. § 201.570).
20 "By adopting such a standardized format the user of the information can de-
velop expertise in processing the labeling information in a systematic manner." W.
Kip Viscusi, Toward a Proper Role for Hazard Warnings in Products Liability Cases, 13 J.
PROD. LIAB. 139, 157 (1991).
21 In contrast, the confusion engendered by decentralized labeling can be demon-
strated by examining the unintended potential effects of the food cancer warning
required by California's Proposition 65. See W. Kip Viscusi, Predicting the Effects of Food
Cancer Risk Warnings on Consumers, 43 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 283, 283 (1988) (explain-
ing that Proposition 65 was a referendum approved by California's voters in 1986 that
required, inter alia, warnings on food products containing cancer-causing chemicals).
Specifically, in all consumer products that pose a lifetime risk of cancer in excess of
1/100,000, California law mandates the following warning:
WARNING: This product contains a chemical known to the State of
California to cause cancer.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 12601 (b) (4) (A) (1989). In contrast, the federally-mandated
saccharin warning, which deals with a 1/2,500 lifetime cancer risk, reads:
Use of this product may be hazardous to your health. This product con-
tains saccharin which has been determined to cause cancer in labora-
tory animals.
21 C.F.R. § 101.11 (1993).
Based on a sample of adult respondents given these warnings, 56% of the individ-
uals who read both labels thought that the saccharin label indicated a product with
less risk than California's warning label. Viscusi, supra, at 296-97. Obviously, the par-
ticular words chosen to convey a warning will affect the level of risks perceived by the
recipient. Multiple risk information sources create the potential for dissonance and
suggest that centralization and standardization are necessary for an effective warnings
policy.
1442
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marketing safety and efficacy information through human clinical
trials. The approval process often commences with an applicant's
submission of an investigational new drug application to conduct
such trials. The application contains information about the drug's
chemistry, pharmacology, and toxicology and includes the results
of animal and laboratory testing.2 2 If the FDA fails to respond by
either requesting more information or seeking modifications to
the protocols for the proposed clinical trials, the trials may
commence.
23
The clinical trial process generally consists of three phases.
Phase I trials involve tests done with small numbers of healthy
adults-twenty to eighty-and are designed to both document a
drug's safety and provide information about "the metabolism and
pharmacologic actions of the drug in humans, [and] the side ef-
fects associated with increasing doses."2 4
If the Phase I trials are successful, human testing proceeds to
Phase II. Phase II trials usually involve 200 to 300 people who are
afflicted with a specific condition or disease. These trials are "con-
ducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug for a particular
indication or indications in patients with the disease or condition
under study" and to determine side effects and problems associ-
ated with the taking of the drug.25
Successful completion of Phase II testing leads the process to
Phase III clinical trials. These trials are substantially larger than
the Phase I or II trials and often involve 1000 to 3000 patients with
a specific condition or disease. 6 As Phase III testing reaches its
conclusion, the applicant generally submits the NDA for the drug
to the FDA.27 The NDA is a compendium of all available data on
the drug's efficacy for the proposed uses as well as its safety, and
includes, among other things, proposed labeling for the drug.28
22 21 C.F.R. § 312 (1993).
23 See generally Note, A Question of Competence: The Judicial Role in the Regulation of
Pharmaceuticals, 103 I-LARv. L. REv. 773, 776 (1990) (explaining the process involved
with a new drug application); David A. Kessler, The Regulation of Investigational Drugs,
320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 281 (1989) (explaining how the FDA regulates investigational
drugs).
24 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (1993).
25 Id. § 312.21(b).
26 Id. § 312.21(c).
27 As noted, the FDA must license any "new drug" before it is marketed in the
United States. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1988).
28 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (1993) (setting forth specific requirements for a new drug
application). The FDCA requires new drug applications to include:
(A) full reports of investigations which have been made to show
whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effec-
19941 1443
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The FDA must ensure that the proposed new drug complies
with the FDCA mandate that safety be established and that "sub-
stantial evidence" of efficacy be demonstrated for the drug's pro-
posed uses. 29  The FDA review process often takes years of
evaluation after the NDA's submission." Ultimately, approval by
the FDA reflects a risk-benefit judgment that the product will en-
hance public health. 1 The entire NDA process is a lengthy one,
typically taking between five and seven years to complete. 2
tive in use; (B) a full list of the articles used as components of such
drug; (C) a full statement of the composition of such drug; (D) a full
description of the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used
for, the manufacture, processing, and packing of such drug; (E) such
samples of such drug and of the articles used as components thereof as
the Secretary may require; and (F) specimens of the labeling proposed
to be used for such drug.
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (1988).
29 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1988):
"[S]ubstantial evidence" means evidence consisting of adequate and
well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by ex-
perts qualified... to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved, on
the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded by such
experts that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to
have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or sug-
gested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof.
Id.
30 Frank E. Young, The Reality Behind the Headlines, in FDA, FROM TEST TUBE TO
PATIENT: NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1988), reprinted in PLI,
BIOTECHNOLOGY- NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL POLICIES AND REGULATIONS 126-29
(1988). Generally, the FDA requests further information from the applicant before
acting on the application. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 283 ("A study of 637 NDAs
received since 1981 found that the FDA returned two thirds to the sponsor with re-
quests for more information.") (footnote omitted).
A 1987 estimate placed the cost of the NDA process at $231 million. Joseph A.
DiMasi et al., Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industy, 10J. HEALTH ECONOMICS
107, 126 (1991); see also Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984:
Hearings on S. 2748 Before the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
106 (1984) (statement of Verne Willaman, Member, Executive Committee,Johnson &
Johnson) ("On average, the cost of developing a new medicine in this country is now
in the $70 to 85 million range."); STEVEN N. WIGGINS, THE COST OF DEVELOPING A NEW
DRUG 16-19 (1987). The cost of drug development has risen much faster than general
inflation. Henry G. Grabowski, The Impact of Regulation on Innovation, 34 FOOD DRUG
COSM. LJ. 555, 555 (1979) (explaining that the cost of developing new drugs is in
excess of $50 million).
NDAs consist of approximately two to fifteen volumes of summary material ac-
companied by ten to one hundred volumes of raw data concerning the safety and
effectiveness of the new drug. Stephen L. Isaacs & Renee Holt, Drug Regulations, Prod-
uct Liability and the Contraceptive Crunch, 8J. LEGAL MED. 533, 536 (1987).
31 Bruce N. Kuhlik & Richard F. Kingham, The Adverse Effects of Standardless Punitive
Damage Awards on Pharmaceutical Development and Availability, 45 FooD DRUG COSM. L.J.
693, 695 (1990); Richard A. Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L.
REV. 1, 10 (1973).
32 Mary T. Griffin, AIDS Drugs & The Pharmaceutical Industry: A Need for Reform, 17
1444
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Certain critics of the FDA, in fact, have suggested that the ef-
fects of the drug licensing provisions of the FDCA and its imple-
menting regulations combine to deprive patients of useful,
innovative drugs." In other words, there are measurable human
costs incurred in developing the detailed drug safety profile re-
quired by this nation's regulatory scheme: "[T] he central point is,
[that with the regulatory scheme for approving drugs] you are
choosing one set of deaths and suffering and illness and costs
against another. That is the only choice open to us."34 These pub-
lic health costs, however, are in a sense hidden: although adverse
reactions result in identifiable victims, the costs of drug unavailabil-
ity are often in the realm of the abstract.35
In evaluating an NDA, the FDA also pays close attention to the
proposed labeling in order to ensure the labeling's reliability. 6
AM. J.L. & MED. 363, 378 n.87 (1991) (citing Gordon, The Drug Development and Ap-
proval Process, in PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, NEW MEDICINES IN
REVIEW 5 (1990)).
33 The review process has meant that new drug therapies are sometimes not intro-
duced in the United States until one to two years after they have been approved in
other western countries. The Comptroller General, Report to the Subcommittee on Sci-
ence, Research, and Technology, IDA Drug Approval-A Lengthy Process That Delays the
Availability of Important New Drugs (1980); see alsoJones v. Lederle Lab., 785 F. Supp.
1123, 1127 (E.D.N.Y.) ("Requiring strict proof of safety-both to comply with FDA
regulations and to avoid tort liability-slows the availability of new products. The
result may well be that dangers will be enhanced during the necessarily extended
developmental period."), affd, 982 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
34 Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Monop-
oly of the Select Committee on Small Business, 93d Cong., 1 st Sess., pt. 23 at 9859 (1973); see
also SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECH. OF THE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECH-
NOLOGY, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION'S PROCESS FOR
APPROVING NEW DRUGS 31 (Comm. Print 1980); Donald Kennedy, A Calm Look at Drug
Lag, 239 JAMA 423 (1978) ("[C]onsumers are poorly served when they are denied
access to safe products.").
35 The AIDS crisis-in which those who would be injured by any delay in drug
marketing have had the ability to organize-has focused some attention on the costs
of delay and has produced some regulatory changes. In particular, steps have been
taken to shorten the time required for broader availability of drugs for life-threaten-
ing diseases. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.34 (making investigational new drugs available for
treatment), 312.80 to .88 (1993) (setting forth rules, regulations and procedures for
expedited approval of new drugs for life-threatening illnesses or diseases).
These reforms suggest that where the outcome of untreated disease is certain
death, the risk-benefit calculus may tolerate additional risks and uncertainty.
36 See generally 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,441 (1979), which states:
Labeling is not intended to be a dispositive treatise of all possible data
and information about a drug. It is intended instead to advise about
potential hazards and to convey documented statements concerning safety
and effectiveness. The act permits labeling statements with respect to
safety only if they are supported by scientific evidence ....
Id. (emphasis added). Accord 21 C.F.R. § 201.56(a) (1993) (stating that labeling must
be based on "scientific information").
HeinOnline  -- 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1445 1993-1994
1446 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1437
The implementing regulations permit warnings on the labels only
when there is significant medical evidence of a possible health haz-
ard.37 Moreover, the regulations also preclude warning of a drug's
unknown or theoretical adverse reactions.38 In other words, the
FDA's labeling policy acknowledges and addresses labeling choices
in the face of scientific uncertainty.
C. Post-Marketing Labeling Changes
There are inherent limitations to pre-marketing testing. In
particular, animal studies are imperfect predictors of adverse
human health consequences. 39 Likewise, pre-market clinical test-
ing cannot and does not uncover all side effects:
Even the most extensive pre-marketing testing can never cover
all possible circumstances. Testing perhaps 3,000 people over a
period of months or even a few years won't always identify a rare
reaction unfolding over a long time, or affecting perhaps just
one person in 10,000. Furthermore, drugs are rarely tested in
such potentially vulnerable groups as the elderly, and never
among pregnant women. Consequently, not every reaction can
be foreseen for the entire population ... 4o
The clinical trial process itself has inherent limitations and can-
not provide a complete safety profile of a product.4" Thus, under the
37 21 C.F.R. § 1.21 (1993).
38 Id. § 201.57(d). Because reported adverse effects may prove to be coincidental
or erroneous, the FDA must determine whether there is a sufficient basis to warrant a
change in labeling.
39 Thalidomide was tested extensively in animals before its use in humans, but the
drug did not cause birth defects in laboratory animals. See Max Sherman & Steven
Strauss, Thalidomide: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 458, 459-
62 (1986).
40 StephenJ. Ackerman, Watching for Problems That Testing May Have Missed, in FDA,
FROM TEST TUBE TO PATIENT: NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1988),
reprinted in PLI, BIOTECHNOLOGY- NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL POLICIES AND REGU-
LATIONS 202, 202 (1988).
41 There has been an increasing trend for the FDA to mandate post-approval re-
search, especially with respect to long-term safety issues. See Nancy Mattison & Bar-
bara W. Richard, PostApproval Research Requested by the FDA at the Time of NCE Approval,
1970-1984, 21 DRUG INFO. J. 309, 313 (1987). Because the pre-market NDA process
cannot detect adverse reactions that materialize on a delayed basis, the FDA's policy
of mandating further "Phase IV" research ensures that the initial risk-benefit judg-
ment made by the agency can be revisited if necessary. This seems to be an appropri-
ate policy inasmuch as further study of an apparently useful drug will generate new
risk information that can address any uncertainties that were noted at the time of the
drug's initial approval.
The FDCA and its implementing regulations do not provide for Phase IV studies.
Nonetheless, the regulated community has consented to the FDA's practices and, in
turn, the agency has communicated its policies to the regulated community. See
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FDCA and its implementing regulations, there is an inevitable degree
of uncertainty about the newly-licensed drug's safety profile. In fact,
one-half or more of a newly-marketed drug's adverse reactions are not
discovered until after the product has been marketed.42
Post-marketing experience generates important information
about a drug's safety profile. The FDCA and its implementing regula-
tions ensure that a manufacturer shares risk information with the
FDA.41 Post-marketing surveillance consists of two primary compo-
nents-reports of individual adverse experiences and epidemiologic
studies.4 Serious reactions must be reported within fifteen working
days of receipt of the information. 45 A comprehensive, post-market-
ing system of reporting and record-keeping requirements ensures that
the manufacturer reports adverse drug experiences discovered in
clinical, epidemiological, or surveillance studies, through review of
the medical literature, or otherwise.46 Post-marketing developments
might require a change in a drug's labeling or, in rare instances, can
lead to restrictions on a product's sale, or even its withdrawal.47
Thus, the FDCA and its implementing regulations ensure that
there is no disparity of information between the FDA and the manu-
facturer. While the manufacturer is allowed some latitude in making
interim labeling changes, the FDA ultimately must approve all post-
marketing changes in labeling. 48 The FDCA regulatory scheme in the
Marion J. Finkel, Phase IV Testing: FDA Viewpoint and Expectations, 33 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 181 (1978).
42 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FDA DRUG REVIEW: POSTAPPROVAL RISKS
1976-85 at 3 (1990) (stating that 51.5% of all drugs approved between 1976 and 1985
had serious risks that were discovered post-approval).
43 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (1993).
44 Gerald A. Faich, Adverse Drug Experience and Product Liability, 41 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 444, 445 (1986).
45 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c)(1) (1993). The report of an adverse event does not re-
flect a conclusion that the injury was iatrogenic. Id. § 314.80(o. In fact, determining
the causation of an adverse event can be difficult and expensive. See, e.g., Claudio A.
Naranjo et al., Idiosyncratic Adverse Drug Reactions: Challenges to Clinical Pharmacologists,
in IDIOSYNCRATIC ADVERSE DRUG REACTIONS: IMPACT ON DRUG DEVELOPMENT AND
CLINICAL USE AFTER MAREETING 1-7 (Claudio A. Naranjo &Judith KJones eds., 1990).
46 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.303(a), 314.80(c) (1993). Post-marketing reporting obliga-
tions include the disclosure of data regarding adverse reactions outside the United
States. Ellen J. Flannery, Reporting Foreign ADRs and ADRs in Phase IV Studies, and the
Significance of Causality Assessment, 46 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 43, 50-51 (1991).
47 Failure to submit post-marketing reports is itself grounds for withdrawal of the
NDA approval. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.81 (d), 314.80(k) (1993).
48 The manufacturer can, in narrow circumstances, make a change prior to FDA
approval pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(2) (1993). At the same time such a
change is made, the manufacturer must seek FDA approval of the unilateral action.
Id. § 314. 70(c). If, however, the FDA disagrees with the manufacturer's unilateral
change in labeling, the agency can institute regulatory action. Accordingly, under the
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end confers upon the FDA final regulatory authority for a pharmaceu-
tical product's labeling. Due to the FDA's experience and expertise,
initial labeling and post-marketing drug labeling determinations are
ultimately made by the FDA, an agency with a high degree of institu-
tional competence.49
III. How COMMON LAW TORT ACTIONS
REGULATE PHARMACEUTICALS
The common law regulates behavior through the imposition
of damage awards against tortfeasors. Liability rules alter behavior
by requiring the tortfeasor to pay for the injury caused. An ideal-
ized tort system can maximize social welfare, but only if certain
conditions can be met.
A. The Regulatory Effects of the Common Law
1. The Unregulated World
Law and economics posits that the tort system should maxi-
mize social welfare by creating incentives that deter some, but not
all, accidents.50 An idealized tort system achieves this objective by
requiring the tortfeasor to pay damages that fully compensate vic-
tims of accidents caused by risks that are cost-effective to elimi-
nate.5 ' For accidents with health effects, the award should be
regulations, any "freedom of action" possessed by a manufacturer exists only until the
agency has determined whether the change is appropriate. If the FDA determines
that the labeling change was or would be inappropriate, the manufacturer cannot
make the change. The practical effect of the regulatory structure and the manufac-
turer's need to maintain its relationship with the FDA is total FDA control over the
contents of the package insert. See Cooper, supra note 4, at 235.
49 See, e.g., Pennington P. Landen, Federal Preemption and the Drug Industry: Can
Courts Co-Regulate?, 43 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 85, 98 (1988) (maintaining that the FDA
is recognized as the pre-eminent drug regulatory authority in the world); Henry E.
Simmons, The Drug Regulatory System of the United States Food & Drug Administration: A
Defense of Current Requirements for Safety and Efficacy, 4 INr'L J. HEALTH SERVS. 95, 97
(1974) (discussing the notion that the FDA is recognized as the most effective na-
tional drug regulatory agency in the world).
50 Some element of risk is inevitable in life because it simply is not feasible to
eliminate all sources of accidental death and injury. Danger is often impossible to
disentangle from beneficial activities. For example, driving faster produces some ben-
efits, but at the same time, faster speed may result in safety costs. Because safety in-
volves both direct costs and costs in terms of avoided useful activities, economists
perceive the function of accidents law as "reduci[ing] the sum cost of the costs of acci-
dents and the costs of avoiding accidents." GuiDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCI-
DENTS 26 (1970).
51 In such a system, the tortfeasor must pay damages that compensate the victim
for not only the economic losses incurred, but also for intangible losses such as pain
and suffering and all other non-economic losses. Such damages must be included
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HeinOnline  -- 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1448 1993-1994
1994] DETERRING INEFFICIENT LITIGATION 1449
equivalent to the amount a firm would have to pay all persons ex-
posed to the risk in order to induce such persons to accept the risk
voluntarily. Where compensation is given only for accidents that
are efficient to avoid, financial incentives will force firms to invest
in safety to the extent necessary to eliminate all awards of damages
and all inefficient risk.52 Thus, in this idealized tort system, the
maximum number of accidents will be avoided given the level of
safety investments deemed efficient.53 The payment of compensa-
tory damages through tort law will have deterred all socially irre-
sponsible risks.
In order for tort law to achieve this goal, however, it must have
perfect information about both the costs of accidents and the costs
of avoiding them. In other words, the tort system must be able to
distinguish between accidents that should be avoided and, there-
fore, compensable, and accidents that should not be deterred be-
cause the social cost of reducing the accident is greater than the
cost of the accident itself.5 4 In situations where the tort system can-
not reliably determine where compensation should be awarded in
order to maximize social welfare, tort law can easily create perverse
incentives, thereby harming social welfare by reducing overall
efficiency.55
within the compensation rule if tort law is to provide appropriate deterrence. Effi-
cient damages awards will make the victim whole in the cases of monetary losses. For
non-monetary losses, the award will not make the victim whole, but will be based on
the compensation amount that will induce efficient risk avoiding behavior. W. KIP
Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LtABLrrv 89-94 (1991).
To the extent that the tort system adopts compensation rather than the deter-
rence of inefficient risks, as a goal, tort law acts as an insurer. Few people, however,
would voluntarily choose to purchase first-party insurance that protects their non-
economic interests from risks society finds inefficient to deter. This suggests that to
the extent a tort regime is compensatory-only, tort law forces consumers to buy an
insurance policy many do not really want. Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The
Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 184, 188 (1987). In other words, the tort
system cannot simultaneously provide both appropriate insurance and appropriate
economic incentives unless the law provides two damages rules: one for negligence
purposes, and another for insurance purposes. See generally id. at 188-90.
52 The result is what economists call "Pareto optimality," and represents a world of
allocative efficiency. In such a world, scarce resources have been allocated such that
no one can be made "better off" without making someone else "worse off."
53 See RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 143 (2d ed. 1977) ("As it
happens, the right amount of deterrence is produced by compelling negligent injur-
ers to make good the victim's losses. Were they forced to pay more.., some econom-
ical accidents might also be deterred; were they permitted to pay less than
compensation, some uneconomical accidents would not be deterred.").
54 Judge Posner believes that the negligence standard is intended to be the switch
for these binary decisions. See id. ("Its economic function is different; it is to deter
uneconomical accidents.").
55 In the context of pharmaceuticals, economic analysis seeks to achieve rational
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2. The Regulated World
In the case of a regulated industry, tort law does not operate in
a vacuum. In particular, the regulatory structure will alter the ac-
tions of the regulated community by imposing criminal or other
sanctions on socially harmful behavior. Such direct regulation can
sometimes achieve the social goal of deterring inefficient accidents
more economically and accurately than the indirect incentives pro-
vided through tort law.56 Moreover, if regulation already deters
the inefficient accident, tort liability will not promote safety in a
desirable manner.57
A body of economics literature has developed that compares
various regulatory schemes in order to determine whether or not
the schemes overdeter or underdeter accidents in the areas they
regulate. The economic analysis generally involves two steps: 1) a
yardstick representing a life valuation figure for the purpose of de-
termining which accidents should be deterred and which would be
tolerated; and 2) a determination of the cost of regulation versus
its beneficial health and safety effects.
a. The Value of Life
Economics can provide useful insights about how individuals
value incremental risks to life-the type of risk typically found in
pharmaceuticals. The standard economic approach to this issue is
to consider the implicit value of a statistical life from the stand-
prescribing such that social welfare, i.e., public health, shows the maximum improve-
ment given the existing drug armamentarium and level of medical understanding.
Classical microeconomics posits that allocative efficiency is achieved through perfect
and costless information. As applied to drug labeling, this suggests that labeling
should reflect current understanding and be in a form that conveys information rap-
idly and efficiently.
56 See CALABRESI, supra note 50, at 102-03 (arguing that regulation can be more
efficient than tort liability with regard to achieving societal goals); see also Steven
Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL SruDIEs 357 (1984)
(same, with thoughtful discussion of comparative utility of tort law and regulation in
varying contexts).
57 Indeed, the efficient accident will still generally occur because the payment of
damages is less costly than liability, and tort law will merely act as a very expensive
insurance system. See Gregory C. Jackson, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May Be Haz-
ardous to Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to Concurrent Regulation, 42 AM. U.L. REv.
199, 233 (1992) ("[E]xposing pharmaceutical manufacturers to strict liability fails to
take into account the FDA's assessment of social utility. Strict liability thus creates
excessive administrative or transactional costs in the form of litigation expenses, with
little or no improvement in safety as measured by those actually injured."). Of course,
if pharmaceutical manufacturers are poor insurers, they will exit from product mar-
kets that impose extraordinary liability costs due to relatively high levels of risk that
cannot be disaggregated from the product's high level of social utility.
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point of prevention. In particular, how much is it worth to individ-
uals to alter a small risk of death that they face? To resolve this
issue, economists have turned to labor market evidence, in particu-
lar the wage levels paid for hazardous jobs.
For example, the typical American worker receives compensa-
tion of approximately $500 annually in return for bearing an an-
nual fatality risk of 1/10,000.58 These amounts are determined
statistically based on large samples of workers rather than formal
stipulations in contracts. Consequently, a group of 10,000 workers
would receive a total of $5 million to face a statistical risk of death
of 1/10,000 each, or one expected death in their group. For this
group, the implicit value of a statistical life is $5 million.
The actual value of a statistical life varies depending on the
particular sample of workers and their characteristics, such as earn-
ings level. The value of life is not a constant, but instead reflects
individuals' attitudes toward life and health. Estimated values-of-
life figures for typical workers range from $3 million to $7 mil-
lion,59 but in some cases the estimates are quite different. Workers
who have chosen very high risk jobs, such as those that pose an
annual fatality risk in the order of 1/1000, typically have an im-
plicit value of life of under $1 million per life.60
Nevertheless, in all cases the implicit value of life based on
prevention is well above the present value of earnings of the aver-
age worker in the group. In particular, the value of life from the
standpoint of prevention often exceeds the present value of the
worker's earnings by a factor of ten. This blow-up factor may, of
course, vary depending on the individual circumstances as well as
on the nature of the injury. In the case of fatalities for the typical
American worker, however, this kind of proportionality is reflective
of the kinds of differences between deterring a statistical death and
the value of earnings associated with an individual's future earning
stream.
These value-of-life figures are not unreasonable. An implicit
value of life of $5 million does not suggest that an individual would
58 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE
1912, 1925-28 (1993) [hereinafter The Value of Risks].
59 Surveys of value-of-life literature appear in W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS:
PUBLIC & PRIVATE RESPONSIBILrIES FOR RISK Chapter 4 (1992) [hereinafter FATAL
TRADEOFFS]. See id. at 73 (valuing life in range of three million to seven million dol-
lars); see also The Value of Risks, supra note 58, at 1942 (also reporting the three million
to seven million dollar value-of-life range).
60 See FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 59, at 56; The Value of Risks, supra note 58, at
1925-28.
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pay $5 million dollars to prevent certain death. Rather, it implicitly
reflects the rate at which individuals would be willing to pay for
greater safety if faced with very small risks of death, such as 1/
10,000.61
These estimates of the implicit value of life are currently used
throughout the federal government and are recommended by the
Office of Management and Budget 62 to evaluate regulations that
promote health and safety and that generate benefits in terms of
reduced fatalities. These judgments are guided by the implicit
value of life based on labor market evidence. The pertinence of
these statistics does not arise because of the regulatory context, but
rather because these values reflect the tradeoffs individuals have
made between money and risks to their health. These tradeoff
amounts are just as pertinent in legal contexts as in regulatory
63
settings.
b. The Costs and Benefits of Various Regulatory Schemes
Including the FDCA and Its Implementing Regulations
The economically imputed value of life can be used to assess
the effect of particular regulations and regulatory schemes in gen-
eral. In some cases, legislation or its implementing regulations will
call for stringent health and safety considerations with little consid-
eration for cost.64 In other cases, however, the regulatory scheme
will demand less safety. For example, the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) has long based its regulations on a valuation of life
61 Restricting these deterrence numbers to small probabilities is not a major limita-
tion. The typical risks posed by products tend to be very small. Product-related fatali-
ties are not the norm for products currently in use, though the lifetime risks
associated with decades of consumption of very risky products such as cigarettes, or
the lifetime risk associated with automobile travel, are quite substantial. The risk asso-
ciated with each unit of consumption, such as a pack of cigarettes or each automobile
trip, is not so inordinately large as to significantly alter the implicit value-of-life that is
appropriate from the standpoint of deterrence.
62 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Program of the United
States Government, April 1, 1992 - March 31, 1993 (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1993). See id. at 633, 634, 637, 638 (discussing the value of life).
63 See generally FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 59, at 34-50.
64 The type of legislative restrictions that led to the very high cost-per-life saved
figures in the accompanying table are often quite extreme. For example, the Clean
Air Act requires that the EPA set its ambient air quality standards based on the risks
associated with air pollutants, where the EPA is prohibited from taking costs into con-
sideration when setting these standards. For further discussion, see FATAL TRADEOFFS,
supra note 59, at 261. Similarly, in the case of the OSHA legislation, the United States
Supreme Court has explicitly ruled out benefit-cost tests. See generally W. Kip Viscusi,
RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE (1983).
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that is based on the present value of lost earnings, rather than on
the higher, economically-imputed value of life.
A review of twenty-four final regulations shows that the regula-
tions provide vastly different health and safety benefits for the
same cost:
65
Regulation
Unvented space heaters
Cabin fire protection
Passive restraints/belts
Underground construction
Alcohol and drug control
Servicing wheel rims
Seat cushion flammability
Floor emergency lighting
Crane suspended personnel platform
Concrete and masonry construction
Hazard communication
Benzene/fugitive emissions
Grain Dust
Radionuclides/uranium mines
Benzene
Arsenic/glass plant
Ethylene oxide
Arsenic/copper smelter
Uranium mill tailings/inactive
Uranium mill tailings/active
Asbestos
Asbestos
Land disposal
Formaldehyde
Year
1980
1985
1984
1989
1985
1984
1984
1984
1988
1988
1983
1984
1987
1984
1987
1986
1984
1986
1983
1983
1986
1989
1988
1987
Agency
CPSC
FAA
NHTSA
OSHA-S
FRA
OSHA-S
FAA
FAA
OSHA-S
OSHA-S
OSHA-S
EPA
OSHA-S
EPA
OSHA-H
EPA
OSHA-H
EPA
EPA
EPA
OSHA-H
EPA
EPA
OSHA-H
Millions of dollars
(1984) per
life saved
.10
.20
.30
.30
.50
.50
.60
.70
1.20
1.40
1.80
2.80
5.30
6.90
17.10
19.20
25.60
26.50
27.60
53.00
89.30
104.20
3,500.00
72,000.00
Because, as noted above, the FAA regulations incorporate the present
value of lost earnings as the basis for measuring benefit, none of the
FAA regulations produced an efficient level of safety, assuming a $5
million valuation of life.
Moreover, the table shows that, as a general matter, regulations
suffer from both under- and over-deterrence. This implies that regu-
latory schemes should not be treated identically for purposes of tort
liability inasmuch as there are some regulatory schemes that fail to
provide efficient deterrence. Tort law can supplement these efforts.
On the other hand, where the regulation is already adequate and de-
ters injuries at or above the efficient level, society would be better off
using its resources to deal with injuries that are less costly to prevent.
By focusing tort law on the regulatory schemes that are inadequate,
65 FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 59, at 264.
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society will achieve more social safety due to better allocation of soci-
ety's investment in risk reduction.
There is a body of economics literature addressing the deterrent
effects of the premarketing approval process required by the FDCA.
The conclusion is that the NDA process is so stringent as to have cre-
ated a drug lag that prevents American consumers from gaining ac-
cess to new pharmaceuticals on a timely basis. At the margin, the
denial of timely access produces more adverse health consequences
than the injuries prevented by the NDA's filtering-out process. There-
fore, the regulatory scheme already provides excess deterrence of
risks.66 This suggests that further regulation of pharmaceuticals
through tort liability is inappropriate, except as a means to compel
regulatory compliance with regulations requiring the sharing of ad-
verse safety information.
67
66 See Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 625 ("By delay-
ing the entry of beneficial drugs into the market, the Food and Drug Administration
has dramatically increased risks to life and health in some settings."); see also HENRY G.
GRAowsro & JOHN M. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: BALANCING
THE BENEFITS AND RISKS (1983); William M. Wardell et al., The Rate of Development of
New Drugs in the United States, 1963 through 1975, 24 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND
THERAPEUTICS 133 (1978); William M. Wardell, Introduction of New Therapeutic Drugs in
the United States and Great Britain: An International Comparison, 14 CuNICAL PHARMACOL-
OGY AND THERAPEUTICS 773, 786-87 (1973).
67 This exception is an important one inasmuch as the criminal and other penal-
ties for violations of the FDCA are much less than potential tort liability. Due to this
divergence, tort liability provides additional and necessary economic incentives for
manufacturers to provide full and complete risk information to the FDA so that the
agency's approval and labeling judgments are based on proper data.
In situations like the MER/29 scandal of the early 1960s, the FDA's risk-benefit
judgments were flawed by the tainted data upon which the agency relied:
We see no logical distinction between the labeling provisions of the act
on the one hand and the reporting provisions on the other, with respect
to the class of persons to be protected or the harm to be prevented.
Permission to market a drug depends in part at least on an evaluation of
test data submitted by an applicant. The submission of false and mis-
leading reports of tests can only subvert the administrative decision, de-
feat the purposes of the act, and make the legend on the label a useless
guide so far as protection of the public is concerned.
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 704 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); see
also William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REv. 791, 808 n.97 (1966) (providing a brief history of the MER/29 controversy and
explaining that MER/29 was a cholesterol-reducing drug that caused severe adverse
reactions by damaging cell structure). For this reason, litigation can play a useful role
as an adjunct to ensure that the FDA receives truthful information.
Nonetheless, the potential for fraud on the agency still remains. For example, in
the early 1980s, Smithkline Beckman marketed the anti-hypertensive drug Selacryn,
but failed to report adverse reactions in a timely and adequate fashion, leading to at
least 500 cases of severe reactions, including 36 deaths. Drug Maker Pleads Guilty Over
Lethal Side Effects, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1984, at A23. Even though the FDA recom-
mended felony charges, the Reagan Justice Department settled for misdemeanor
HeinOnline  -- 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1454 1993-1994
DETERRING INEFFICIENT LITIGATION
c. The Role of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are damage awards above and beyond the
compensatory level required for tort law to deter inefficient acci-
dents. Nonetheless, punitive damages are commonly justified on
three grounds: deterrence, compensation and retribution. When
these rationales are examined in depth, however, only the deter-
rence rationale withstands scrutiny.
Viewed from the standpoint of deterrence, the tort system is
saddled with some imperfections. For example, wrongful death
statutes typically undercompensate decedents without heirs by
truncating recoverable damages. Other limitations on non-eco-
nomic losses also cause the tort system to depart from the deter-
rence ideal. In addition, injured parties often do not pursue legal
remedies even though they have been injured as a result of ineffi-
cient risk. Increasing awards with a punitive damage component
can potentially offset the inadequate deterrence caused by these
distortions. Determining the optimum level of additional compen-
sation may, however, be quite difficult.
In addition, punitive damages can potentially augment safety
incentives in situations where companies' safety efforts fall greatly
short of what is required. This is the ideal context for using addi-
tional damages to enhance safety incentives. In such circum-
stances, punitive damages may force an irresponsible manufacturer
to take swift remedial action, effectuating thereby greater marginal
safety gains than in situations where the defendant is somewhat re-
sponsible, but not responsible enough. Again, however, there can
be great difficulty in determining the appropriate additional award
necessary to create appropriate deterrence, but not over-
deterrence. 68
pleas. Philip Shenon, Dispute Over Intent in Drug Case Divided F.D.A. and Justice Dept.,
N.Y. T MES, Sept. 19, 1985, at Al.
Similarly, Eli Lilly & Company failed to report adverse reactions to the FDA for
the non-steroidal, anti-inflammatory drug Oraflex. The failure to report adverse reac-
tions led to Congressional hearings and criminal sanctions against Lilly. Philip She-
non, Lilly Pleads Guilty to Orafiex Charges, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 22, 1985, at A16.
Although it is irrational for a drug company to fail to report adverse reactions-
the product's shortcomings will eventually come out-tort law creates incentives for
truthfulness above and beyond the criminal and other sanctions contained in the
FDCA. Selacryn and Oraflex should have been withdrawn much sooner than they
actually were. The manufacturers' misconduct in keeping the FDA in the dark im-
posed inefficient and irresponsible risks upon consumers. For this reason, violations
of the FDCA's reporting requirements are appropriately seen as negligence per se.
See Stanton v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, 718 F.2d 553, 563-64 (3d Cir. 1983)
(construing Pennsylvania law) (footnote omitted).
68 Punitive damages are problematic, however, because they are so blunt an instru-
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The second potential objective of punitive damages is that of
compensation. This objective is implied by notions of corrective
69justice. In cases of monetary loss, the objective of compensation
is to restore the level of welfare to what it was prior to the accident.
The objective of compensation, however, is addressed by the stan-
dard components of tort liability.
Damages rules already recognize the need to compensate for
wrongfully-inflicted economic harm. In addition, even non-mone-
tary components of the loss, such as pain and suffering damages
and loss of consortium, are addressed through conventional com-
ponents of liability awards. An additional component provided by
punitive damages is not needed to compensate for these losses. In
particular, the level of compensation the courts provide is in-
tended to be optimal even in situations in which punitive damages
are not awarded. As a result, the insurance/compensation ration-
ale cannot provide an independent motivation for punitive
damages.
The final potential objective of punitive damages is that of ret-
ribution. Some observers have suggested that punitive damages
serve the function of retributive punishment. To arrive at an an-
swer of whether an individual consumer would choose to have such
retributive payments, the question becomes whether a higher
product price due to the risk of punitive damages awards based on
retribution is warranted by any additional value consumers derive
from such punishment. One cannot rule out the possibility that
consumers may in fact be willing to pay a higher product price for
punitive damages that punish corporations, but it may also be the
case that much of what is generally viewed as retribution is in fact a
concern with deterrence. Specifically, consumers certainly would
want corporations to exercise the efficient degree of responsibility
with respect to product safety. That objective, however, is already
ment that they can easily produce over-deterrence, even in the face of misconduct.
See generally II Reporters' Study (American Law Institute), Enterprise Responsibility for
Personal Injuiy 231-66 (1991) [hereinafter II Reporters' Study].
69 Corrective justice conceives of tort law as a means of correcting wrongs to plain-
tiffs caused by an actor's wrongful conduct or invasion of another's rights. Unlike
loss-spreading theories of tort, corrective justice requires an underlying wrong and
focuses on restoring the equilibrium that existed between the wrongdoer and injured
party before the wrong occurred.
Economic analysis attempts to give content to the definition of a "wrong" by pos-
iting that the tort system should achieve a balance between injury-preventing conduct
and the benefits which are achieved by using the same resources in an alternative
manner. In other words, the law and economics view of a "wrong" flows from society's
need to use scarce resources efficiently.
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served by the imposition of punitive damages to deter companies
that have fallen greatly short of the efficient safety level.
Of course, the imposition of punitive damages cannot bejusti-
fied where direct regulation already sufficiently deters inefficient
risk. As we have already seen, the FDCA regulatory scheme already
over-deters inefficient risk, provided that accurate and complete
information is provided to the FDA. In such circumstances, the
imposition of punitive damages will either create incentives to exit
from a product market or create adverse effects on price which
hinder overall allocative efficiency. Neither effect is desirable. In-
stead, the proper role of punitive damages should be limited to
that of an adjunct to compensatory damages to assure that pharma-
ceutical companies provide full and complete information to the
agency.
B. How The Common Law Regulates Pharmaceuticals
1. The Collapse of Predictability
In order to determine the actual regulatory effect of the tort
system, it is necessary to examine two issues: 1) what are the liabil-
ity and damage rules in use; and 2) whether there are inherent
institutional limitations in the tort system that suggest that lawsuits
are an inappropriate mechanism to respond to the risks and uncer-
tainties posed by pharmaceutical products.
a. The Products Liability Revolution
Products liability law underwent a revolution as a result of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.7" Strict liability, as codified in Section
402A, generally replaced negligence as plaintiffs' preferred theory
of liability because the strict liability theory reduced plaintiffs' bar-
riers to recovery. Under Section 402A, liability is imposed when-
ever a product causes injury and is "in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous" even though "all possible care" was exer-
cised "in the preparation and sale of the product."'"
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts apparently did
not intend that pharmaceuticals would be subject to strict liability.
In particular, strict liability was not meant to apply to "unavoidably
unsafe products" which comment k defines through examples, all
of which involve drugs or vaccines:
70 Prosser, supra note 67, at 802-03 (discussing innovative concepts embodied in
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1964)).
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964).
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Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in
the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of
being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are
especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding exam-
ple is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not
uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences
when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a
dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine
are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidably high degree
of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared,
and accompanied by proper directions and warnings, is not de-
fective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of
many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this
reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians or under the
prescription of a physician. It is also true in many new72 or ex-
perimental73 drugs as to which, because of the lack of time and
opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no
assurance of safety ... but such experience as there is justifies
the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically
recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the
qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and
proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to
be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending
their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the pub-
lic with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended
with a known but apparently reasonable risk. '
72 As noted above, "new drug" is a term of art under the FDCA:
(p) the term "new drug" means-
(1) Any drug (except a new animal drug or an animal feed bearing
or containing a new animal drug) the composition of which is such that
such drug is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scien-
tific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of
drugs, as safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, rec-
ommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof, except that such a
drug not so recognized shall not be deemed to be a "new drug" if at any
time prior to June 25, 1938, it was subject to the Food and Drugs Act of
June 30, 1906, as amended, and if at such time its labeling contained
the same representations concerning the conditions of its use; or
(2) Any drug (except a new animal drug or an animal feed bearing
or containing a new animal drug) the composition of which is such that
such drug, as a result of investigations to determine its safety and effec-
tiveness for use under such conditions, has become so recognized, but
which has not, otherwise than in such investigations, been used to a
material extent or for a material time under such conditions.
21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1988).
73 Experimental drugs are those undergoing Phase I, Phase II, or Phase III clinical
trials. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (1993).
74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1964).
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Thus, under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, strict liability was to be
imposed for all harms caused by "defective products, unreasonably
dangerous" despite the exercise of due care, except that for "unavoid-
ably unsafe" products, i.e., pharmaceuticals, proof of negligence
would be necessary.7 5
After the adoption of Section 402A, the judiciary in various states
were called upon to give meaning to the phrase "defective condition,
unreasonably dangerous." Although the liability rule of Section 402A
suggested that negligence was still important, the judicial gloss moved
away from negligence and towards no-fault rules.
This movement was aided by judicial interpretations that may
have conflicted with the intent of Section 402A's drafters. In particu-
lar, the drafting history of Section 402A shows that the participants in
the ALI proceedings intended that liability was to be imposed after two
findings: 1) defectiveness; and 2) unreasonably dangerous.76 Signifi-
cantly, the drafters intended that the "unreasonably dangerous" test-
with its negligence aspect-be the primary liability test.77 The defective-
ness test was intended to insulate from potential liability products
such as whiskey and cigarettes that presented known and substantial
risks.7" Such products were not "defective" and, therefore, the manu-
facturer was not strictly liable for the ensuing harm.
In Cronin v. JB.E. Olson Corp.,79 however, the California Supreme
Court discarded the "unreasonably dangerous" test after finding that
"the Restatement formulation of strict liability in practice rarely leads
to a different conclusion than would have been reached under laws of
negligence. " " Negligence was no longer the liability rule in products
litigation.8" Henceforth, "defectiveness"-a term that the drafters of
the Restatement did not carefully define-became the central tenet of
products liability law.
The products liability revolution then concentrated on the defini-
75 Professor Page has written a brief history on the drafting of Section 402A. See
Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for Strict Liability,
58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 853, 864-66 (1983).
76 J. Clark Kelso, Brown v. Abbott Lab. and Strict Products Liability, 20 PAC. L.J. 1, 16
(1988) (footnote omitted).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 17.
79 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).
80 Id. at 1162 (citations omitted).
81 Numerous other courts eliminated the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement
from non-comment k litigation. See, e.g., Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co.,
81 N.J. 150, 176-77, 406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp.,
337 A.2d 893, 900 (Pa. 1975) ("We hold today that the 'reasonable man' standard in
any form has no place in a strict liability case.").
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tion of "defectiveness."8 2 Specifically, having concluded that negli-
gence concepts should be excised from strict liability, the courts
needed to find a verbal formula that delineated the liability rule.83
California again provided a leading approach. The California
Supreme Court defined "defectiveness" in Barker v. Lull Engineering
Co. 4 as follows:
[A] product is defective in design either (1) if the product has
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would ex-
pect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable man-
ner, or (2) if, in the light of the relevant factors discussed below,
the benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the risk
of danger inherent in such design. 8
5
Consumer expectations tests86 and risk-utility87 tests proliferated
82 During this phase of the products liability revolution, courts repeatedly insisted
that manufacturers were not insurers of their products, i.e., they were not subject to
absolute liability. See, e.g., Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 667 P.2d 750, 754 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1983) ("Strict liability... cannot be equated with absolute liability.") (citation
omitted); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 181 (Mich. 1984) (holding that
sellers not subject to absolute liability) (footnote omitted); Shawver v. Roberts Corp.,
280 N.E.2d 226, 231 (Wis. 1979) ("Strict liability does not make the manufacturer or
seller an insurer nor does it impose absolute liability.").
83 Commentators shrewdly questioned whether the new rule of strict liability, but
not absolute liability, could ever be articulated in a meaningful manner. According to
one such account: "despite the courts' recognition that strict liability must be limited,
they have seldom been very confident in trying to describe the limits. Indeed, their
efforts at answering the questions posed in strict liability cases seem in many cases to
degenerate into... meaningless semantic disputes. . ... " Guido Calabresi & Jon T.
Hirschoff, Toward a Test For Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE LJ. 1055, 1056 (1972).
84 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
85 Id. at 446.
86 See, e.g., Syrie v. Knoll Int'l, 748 F.2d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 1984) ("A defective
product is one that is unreasonably dangerous, i.e., dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary user of the product, with the ordi-
nary knowledge common to the community as to the product's characteristics.") (cita-
tions omitted); Falkenbury v. Elder Cadillac, Inc., 440 N.E.2d 180, 185 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982) ("[Tlhe product must be dangerous beyond which would be contemplated by
the ordinary consumer."); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 NJ. 169, 181, 463 A.2d 298,
304 (1983) (stating that one standard for measuring the defectiveness of a product is
the consumer expectation test in which "the failure of the product to perform safely
may be viewed as a violation of the reasonable expectations of the consumer") (cita-
tion omitted).
87 See, e.g., Davidson v. Stanadyne, Inc., 718 F.2d 1334, 1339 (5th Cir. 1983)
(whether a product has unreasonably dangerous defective design "requires a balanc-
ing by the jury of its utility against the likelihood and gravity of injury") (quotation
omitted); Johnson v. Salem Corp., 97 NJ. 78, 88, 477 A.2d 1246, 1251 (1984) (stating
that the risk-utility analysis calls for a consideration and balancing of the "primary
purpose of the product, the likelihood of injury due to design, and the effect of im-
provements in safety design on the utility or the price of the product") (citations
omitted); Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864, 872 (N.Y. 1984) (whether a product is
reasonably safe for its intended use is determined by whether a reasonable person
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through the various jurisdictions.
The new liability rules unfortunately did not yield predictable re-
sults."8 This lack of predictability undoubtedly has increased the com-
plexity and cost of litigation." As a result, the total transactional costs
of litigation now exceed the total recoveries of all claimants. °
with knowledge of the potential for injury and of the available alternatives, balancing
the product's risk against its utility and costs, and against the risks, utility, and cost of
the alternatives, would have concluded that the product should not have been
marketed).
88 As the Fifth Circuit has correctly noted:
[I]n the typical products liability case, the jury is asked to decide
whether a product was defective. Stripped to essentials, jury instruc-
tions regarding defect are little more than an open-ended request to
balance utility and safety. Absence of rigor in the inquiries that deter-
mine liability does not necessarily result from poor drafting of the
charge; rather, the difficulty is often inherent in the underlying substan-
tive law.
In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, Louisiana, 795 F.2d 1230, 1233 (5th Cir.
1986).
89 For example, Dean Wade's risk-utility test involved seven factors:
* The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user
and to the public as a whole.
" The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause
injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
" The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be as unsafe.
" The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to
maintain its utility.
" The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of
the product.
" The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the prod-
uct and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the
obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warn-
ings or instructions.
* The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss
by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38
(1973) (footnote omitted). The Wade test is not brightline, and, in addition, the
multiple inquiries that the test poses require the generation of considerable
information.
In addition, the abolition of non-mutual issue preclusion has raised the stakes
inasmuch as one adverse verdict can have an enormous impact on cases involving
similar facts. Cf I Reporters' Study (American Law Institute), Enterprise Responsibility
for Personal Injury 60 (1991) [hereinafter I Reporters' Study] (noting the growth of
"high stakes" litigation).
90 DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND
THE STATISTICS at 26 (RAND Inst. Civ. Justice 1987) (1986 RAND study concludes that
the annual overall transaction costs of the tort system exceed compensation to plain-
tiffs); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litiga-
tion-And Why Not, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1283 (1992) (citing ROBERT W. STURGIS,
THE COST Or THE U.S. TORT SYSTEMS: AN ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN INSURANCE Asso-
CIATION (1985)).
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The expansion of products claims arising from the strict liability
revolution has been extraordinary. For example, product liability fil-
ings in the federal courts increased from 2,393 in 1975 to 14,145 in
1987.91 Likewise, the data show extraordinary increases in premium
payments and payments for injuries.9 2
b. The Strict Liability Revolution Strikes Pharmaceuticals
Despite comment k, the products liability revolution also pro-
foundly affected pharmaceuticals.93 In particular, a number of ju-
risdictions found that pharmaceuticals were not unavoidably
unsafe as a matter of law.9 4 In addition, courts almost unanimously
91 W. Kip Viscusi, The Dimension of the Product Liability Crisis, 20 J. LEGAL STUDIES
147, 150 (1991).
92 See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1521, 1527 (1987) (explaining that the expanded scope of product liability
laws has left product manufacturers with increases in liability insurance costs with
increases of as much as 1500% in some cases); I Reporters' Study, supra note 89, at 60
(over the past 40 years, general liability insurance costs have increased over four times
the rate of the growth of the economy).
93 See Note, supra note 23, at 777-79 (despite extensive FDA regulation and poten-
tial exclusion under comment k to Section 402A, strict liability is often applied against
pharmaceuticals).
94 Instead, jurisdictions have generally applied comment k on a case-by-case basis.
See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1989) ("The drafters of
comment k did not intend to grant all manufacturers of prescription drugs a blanket
exception to strict liability."); Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652,
654-56 (1st Cir. 1981) (reasoning that a manufacturer of oral contraceptives could be
held strictly liable on theories of defective design and inadequate warnings); Mar-
tinkovic v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 212, 217 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (asserting that
manufacturer of vaccine not entitled to pursue the comment k defense when it did
not establish adequate warnings); Graham v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1483,
1497 (D. Kan. 1987) (whether a drug falls within comment k's protection involves
weighing the benefits of the product against the risks, and the design must be as safe
as the best available testing and research) (quotation omitted); Toner v. Lederle Lab.,
732 P.2d 297, 308 (Idaho 1987) (stating that comment k does not apply to all drugs,
but rather, applies "when the situation calls for it"); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 97 N.J.
429, 441-42, 479 A.2d 374, 380 (1984) ("We do not agree that the protective shield of
comment k immunizes all prescription drugs. Moreover, we are of the opinion that
generally the principle of strict liability is applicable to manufacturers of prescription
drugs."); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 52 (Wis. 1984) (noting a previous
refusal to adopt the rule embodied in comment k, the court concluded that manufac-
turers could be held strictly liable if drugs are marketed without adequate prior
testing).
Two jurisdictions have, however, noted that the need for predictability in phar-
maceutical litigation requires that pharmaceuticals approved by the FDA automati-
cally receive comment k protection for design defect claims. See Brown v. Superior
Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477 (Cal. 1988) (noting that strict liability is not an available
theory of recovery in an action involving design defects of prescription drugs);
Grundberg v. The Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991) (adopting the principle
that "all prescription drugs should be classified as unavoidably dangerous in design
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held that compliance with the FDCA and its implementing regula-
tions did not constitute a complete defense to a products liability
action.95 Thus, despite the presence of a comprehensive licensing
system operating at the federal level, pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers can be found responsible in tort even in the face of compliance
with this system. In fact, comment k itself steered plaintiffs to the
most prominent theory in pharmaceutical litigation: the inade-
quate warning or failure to warn claim.96 This trend arose and per-
sisted even though the FDA had comprehensive labeling control
under the FDCA and its implementing regulations.
c. The Failure to Adopt Regulatory Compliance in Pharmaceutical
Litigation
The failure to adopt regulatory compliance as a presumptive
defense has defined the nature of pharmaceutical litigation. The
common law generally proceeds with fairly broad legal proposi-
tions defining an appropriate standard of care, rather than with
narrowly focused rules applicable only to specific fact patterns. In
the absence of narrowly crafted rules of law, the role of the jury as
policymaker is enhanced. Because the jury must give the broad
standard substantive content, it serves not only as factfinder, but
also as lawgiver.97
Thejudiciary's reluctance to adopt regulatory compliance as a
presumptive defense is unsurprising. Historically, compliance with
various regulatory statutes and schemes has not been a complete
because of their unique nature and value, the elaborate regulatory system overseen by
the FDA," and the inherent difficulties of the use of tort to review a drug's design).
95 Jeffrey N. Gibbs & Bruce F. Mackler, Food and Drug Administration Regulations and
Products Liability: Strong Sword, Weak Shield, 22 TORT & INs. L.J. 194, 243 (1987) (con-
cluding that compliance with FDA regulation provides "only modest protection
against the successful lawsuit"); Thomas Scarlett, The Relationship Among Adverse Drug
Reaction Reporting, Drug Labeling Product Liability, and Federal Preemption, 46 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 31, 39 (1991) (compliance with government standards merely a factor in
liability determination).
96 See, e.g., Plummer v. Lederle Lab., 819 F.2d 349, 352 (2d Cir.) ("[I]n assessing
the potential liability of prescription drug manufacturers, it is essential to review the
informational inserts provided with the drugs."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898 (1987);
PRODUCTS LIABILrrY PEMACEuriCAL DRUG CASES 122 (Donald E. Vinson & Alexan-
der H. Slaughter eds., 1988) (due to "special social position of pharmaceutical prod-
ucts," manufacturers are burdened with "failure to warn" liability).
97 See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 469,
475-76 (1987). In contrast, narrow rules of law constrain the jury's policy function.
For example, in many jurisdictions there are detailed, standardized charges to deal
with automobile accidents. In such cases, the function of the jury will be to determine
the facts and apply them to a rule that is outcome determinative. In such cases, the
jury's function is to determine credibility and nothing else.
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defense in a tort action.9" Instead, the general rule is that the de-
fendant's compliance with statutes and regulations is evidence of
due care.
This common law rule emerged from early railroad cases.99
State statutes and regulations set guidelines for safeguards at rail-
road crossings, but accidents occurred and lawsuits followed any-
way.' 00 A review of these statutes shows that the drafters never
intended that compliance with the statutes would necessarily ab-
solve the railroad from liability.' Thus, in 1892, the United States
Supreme Court, in Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Ives,102 noted that
almost all states had held that regulatory compliance was not a
complete defense to tort actions in railroad crossing cases. The
minimum standards doctrine survived the horse and buggy era and
was transplanted into automobile liability litigation.10 3
The drafters of the Restatement accepted the minimum stan-
dards doctrine and established the rule still in effect today: "Com-
pliance with a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation
does not prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable man
would take additional precautions." 1 4 Consequently, the black-
letter rule is that compliance with regulatory standards does not
presumptively establish non-liability; such regulations represent
only a floor, not a ceiling for liability.'
Initially, there were a few courts willing to accept the FDA's
98 See generally Paul Dueffert, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26
HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 175, 188-213 (1989) (providing overview of courts' acceptance and
nonacceptance of regulatory compliance defense).
99 STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULA-
TORY POLICY 26-29 (2d ed. 1985).
100 Dueffert, supra note 98, at 180.
10, Id. at 182.
102 144 U.S. 408 (1892).
103 Dueffert, supra note 98, at 180-88. There were, however, early cases involving
automobile accidents in which courts accepted regulations as stating the appropriate
standard of care. Id at 186 n.53. These cases led to a comment with great potential
significance, as yet unrealized, to pharmaceutical litigation: "Where there are no spe-
cial circumstances, the minimum standard prescribed by the legislation or regulation
may be accepted by... the court as a matter of law, as sufficient for the occasion .... "
Id. at 186 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C cmt. a (1964)). The
factors that a court should apply to make this discretionary ruling are not set forth in
the Restatement. Id. at 187.
104 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1964); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 233 (5th ed. 1984).
105 Dueffert, supra note 98, at 175-76; see also 4 INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PROD-
ucr LIABILrrY, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, ITFPL-77/02, PRODUCT LIA2mrrv FINAL RE-
PORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY 137 (1977) (indicating that so few courts regard regulatory
compliance as a complete defense that it is not even a minority rule).
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judgment on drug approval and labeling. For example, the Ore-
gon Supreme Court ruled that:
[A] drug, properly tested, labeled with appropriate warnings, ap-
proved by the Food and Drug Administration, and marketed
properly under federal regulation, is, as a matter of law, a rea-
sonably safe product. Accordingly, a person claiming to have
suffered adverse effects from using such a drug, unless he can
prove an impurity or an inadequacy in labeling, may not recover
against the seller for breach of warranty. 10 6
This decision was overruled by the Oregon Supreme Court in less
than a decade. 10
7
Acceptance of the FDA regulatory compliance defense has always
represented a minority position. The overwhelming majority of state
and federal court decisions do not defer to the FDA.' Most of these
106 Lewis v. Baker, 413 P.2d 400, 404 (Or. 1966) (citation omitted). Likewise, in
McDaniel v. McNeil Lab., Inc., the Nebraska Supreme Court acknowledged that:
[T] here is a difference of opinion among expert witnesses as to whether
[the] facts establish that Innovar is or is not a defective and unreasona-
bly dangerous drug. That issue was presented to the [FDA] in 1968. Its
determination is persuasive and controlling in the absence of evidence
that the determination was based upon inaccurate, incomplete, mislead-
ing, or fraudulent information.
241 N.W.2d 822, 828 (Neb. 1976); see also Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 175-
78 (Cal. 1993) (holding that FDA-drafted Reyes syndrome warnings for over-the-
counter aspirins were adequate as a matter of law; a "minimum" legislative standard
may be accepted by the court as sufficient where the record shows that the standard
addresses the specific conduct at issue).
107 McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 533-34 (Or. 1974).
108 See, e.g., Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1030 (D.NJ. 1988)
(FDA regulation of prescription drugs may establish minimum design and warning
standards, but compliance does not necessarily relieve manufacturers from tort liabil-
ity); Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1362 (4th Cir. 1975) ("[Clompliance
with federal laws and regulations . . .though pertinent, does not in itself absolve a
manufacturer of liability.") (citation omitted); MacGillivray v. Lederle Lab., 667 F.
Supp. 743, 746 (D.N.M. 1987) ("Statutes and regulations of federal agencies, while
setting minimum standards, are not necessarily dispositive of whether or not a prod-
uct is 'defective' under state products liability law.") (citation omitted); Graham v.
Wyeth Lab., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1491 (D. Kan. 1987) ("FDA regulations of prescription
drugs are generally viewed as setting minimum standards, both as to design and warn-
ing.") (citations omitted); Martinkovic v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 212, 217
(N.D. Ill. 1987) ("Wyeth's asserted compliance with FDA requirements regarding the
vaccine does not establish this element in favor of Wyeth: compliance is but one
factor for the jury to consider in deciding the reasonableness of the manufacturer's
conduct.") (citations omitted); Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991, 997
(D.N.D. 1966) ("Although all of the Government regulations and requirements had
been satisfactorily met in the production and marketing of Quadrigen, the standards
promulgated were minimal."), affd, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969); see also Stevens v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973); Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceuti-
cal Corp., 681 P.2d 1038 (Kan.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984); Feldman v. Lederle
Lab., 97 N.J. 429, 461, 479 A.2d 374, 391 (1984); Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
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opinions note that the FDA does not prevent all potentially harmful
drugs from reaching the market. Thus:
Despite the FDA's best efforts, negligently designed drugs may
and apparently do sometimes reach the market. Nothing in fed-
eral statutory or regulatory law indicates that FDA certification
intends to preclude allegations of negligence in these cases.109
Indeed, the newer state tort reform measures do not significantly aid
the pharmaceutical manufacturer because they do not treat the FDCA
any differently than other regulatory schemes which may in fact be
minimal. 110 Once the FDA's role is "minimalized," pharmaceutical lit-
682 P.2d 832, 836 (Utah 1984); Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1229 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1979) (FDA regulations are minimum standards, compliance does not
change common law duties) (citations omitted).
109 Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 311 n.12 (Idaho 1987) (citations omitted).
The court also remarked: "FDA certification represents only the FDA's opinion, al-
beit an informed one, of the safety and efficacy of the drug. Regrettably, drugs occa-
sionally prove not so safe as the FDA first believed." Id.
Unfortunately, the Idaho Supreme Court never really explains how the pharma-
ceutical at issue-the DPT whole-cell vaccine-proved not to be as safe as the FDA
first believed. Ironically, after criticizing the FDA for allegedly not understanding the
safety profile of DPT and thereby failing to protect public heath, the court abdicates
its responsibility for weighing the public health and policy implications of imposing
liability on a drug manufacturer:
No doubt liability flowing from the occasional injuries inflicted by the
vaccine acts as a disincentive to its manufacture. However, this Court is
not equipped to decide as a matter of public health policy that the rela-
tive efficacy and safety of the whole cell vaccine is so well established
and the plight of Lederle so dire that injured persons such as Kevin
Toner should be denied any recourse.
Id. at 312.
110 In 11 states, tort reform measures have incorporated the general rule that regu-
latory compliance is merely evidence of due care. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
683(1) (West 1992) (providing that proof of compliance with state of art constitutes
complete defense in any product liability defective design or fabrication action); Axx.
CODE ANN. § 16-116-105(a) (1987) (providing that proof of compliance with govern-
mental standards is evidence that product is not unreasonably dangerous in product
liability action); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-403(1)(a) & (b) (West 1989) (providing
that proof of compliance with either "state of the art" or governmental standard gives
rise to rebuttable presumption of non-negligence and non-defectiveness in any prod-
uct liability action); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(a) (1992) (if there is compliance with
governmental standard, the product is deemed not defective unless the claimant
proves that a reasonably prudent manufacturer would have taken additional precau-
tions); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2) (Michie 1992) (providing that compliance
with "generally recognized and prevailing standards or state of the art" gives rise to
rebuttable presumption of non-negligence and non-defectiveness in any product lia-
bility action); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(2) (West 1986) (evidence concern-
ing compliance with governmental standards is admissible); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 507-D:4 (1983) (compliance with government standards is an element of an affirma-
tive defense); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (1980) (providing that compliance with
governmental standard gives rise to rebuttable presumption that the product was not
unreasonably dangerous with regard to matters covered by the regulation); UTAH
1466
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igation tends to proceed like any other products case.
The failure to recognize regulatory compliance as a presumptive
defense leaves the factfinder without any meaningful yardstick."'1 Yet,
the jury must determine issues that potentially can have a profound
effect on public health.
2. The Failure of Tort Law As a Regulatory Mechanism
As noted, there is often very little legal structure involved in
litigation involving pharmaceuticals. Comment k may or may not
exempt the manufacturer from strict liability. 12 Regulatory com-
pliance likewise provides uncertain protection. As a result, jurors
are left with few yardsticks to decide cases involving failures to pro-
vide warnings in pharmaceutical products liability cases.' 3 Appli-
cation of broad liability rules and the application of 20-20
CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (Michie 1992) (rebuttable presumption that a product is free
from defect where it complies with government standards); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 7.72.050(1) (West 1992) (evidence concerning compliance with governmental stan-
dards can be considered by trier of fact).
The various state legislatures, like the common law, treat all regulated products
in the same manner. Although this is consistent with the judiciary's treatment of the
regulatory compliance test, this broad brush treatment is inappropriate because each
regulatory scheme should be individually analyzed to see if it provides over- or under-
deterrence. By creating a presumption that all regulatory schemes are sufficient, the
statutes have lumped all regulations together. As noted above, economic analysis
shows that this is not the proper method to maximize social welfare.
New Jersey is the only jurisdiction to specifically address pharmaceuticals in tort
reform legislation. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 1987) (providing for rebutta-
ble presumption that warning approved by FDA is adequate). On the other hand,
Texas specifically excludes pharmaceuticals from the reach of its tort reform. TEX.
Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.005(d) (2) (Vernon 1993 & Supp. 1994) (tort re-
form statute not applicable to design defect claims for products regulated under the
FDCA).
111 SeeJames A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturer's Liability for Defective Product Design: A
Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C. L. REv. 625, 638 (1978) ("The utility of federal prod-
uct safety regulations as standards for decision is their specificity."). To the extent
that legal commentary concerns itself solely with the ease of making a decision, Pro-
fessor Henderson is surely correct. Bright line rules are, all things being equal, pref-
erable to multifactorial, indeterminate standards.
The larger consequences of a rule of decision are generally more important.
Simplicity alone is not enough. After all, the simplest rules would be either to always,
or never, impose liability. Regulation should be decisive only where it adequately pro-
tects society. Of course, where a regulation adequately protects society, the simple
rule of law has the additional benefit of reducing litigation costs.
112 This determination, in turn, may be made by the court or the jury. See generally
George H. King, Note, A Prescription for Applying Strict Liability: Not All Drugs Deserve
Comment k Immunization, 21 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 809, 819-20 (1989) (discussing Brown v. Su-
perior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988)).
113 As noted above, most states employ standardized jury charges in products liabil-
ity cases that use broad standards of care, rather than specific rules of law. Quite
often, jury charges in pharmaceutical litigation are the same or quite similar to the
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hindsight often places juries in the position of second guessing the
FDA on the types of warnings that should be provided with pre-
scription drug products and which products should be marketed.
Too often these judgments collide.
a. Labeling Litigation
In the context of warnings litigation, the absence of meaning-
ful standards is quite troublesome. In particular, when reviewed
after a drug-induced injury, there are few, if any, warnings that can-
not be criticized in some aspect.1 1 4 A factfinder can always find
that a warning should have been more prominent or more specific.
The context in which that judgment will be made-after a plain-
tiffs serious injury-can hardly give the manufacturer comfort. In-
deed, in a number of instances juries have deemed inadequate
warnings that even the FDA has either drafted or required manu-
facturers to include in labeling.115
In such an environment, pharmaceutical companies have real
incentives to adopt a warnings strategy that warns of nearly every-
thing." 6 Such a warnings strategy conflicts, however, with the
FDA's regulatory goals of both reliability and brevity. Overwarning
is also not in the interests of consumers because it hinders the abil-
ity of health care professionals to distinguish the relative risks
posed by various drugs. Some courts have correctly recognized
that the present litigation environment creates incentives for man-
ufacturers to adopt a warnings strategy that actually hinders these
goals."7
charges that would be given in any other products liability case, inasmuch as strict
liability model charges are as muddled as the underlying strict liability case law.
114 See Kellen F. Cloney, Note, AIDS Vaccine Manufacturers v. Tort Regime: The Need for
Alternatives, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 559, 578 (1992) ("Even if the FDA has required,
approved or actually drafted the specific warning in question, a lay jury can still con-
clude that [the warning] was inadequate.").
115 See CharlesJ. Walsh & Marc S. Klein, The Conflicting Objectives of Federal and State
Tort Law Drug Regulation, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 171, 185-188 (1986) (discussing
Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984), where manufacturer was
not insulated from liability as a matter of law, even though the FDA had rejected the
manufacturer's attempt to warn of the injury plaintiff suffered).
116 W. Kip Viscusi, REFORMING PRODucTs LIABILrTY 151 (1991); Aaron D. Twerski et.
al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Product Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of
Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495, 514 (1976).
117 The court in Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co. explained that:
[I]t seems obvious that liability ought not to be imposed for failure to
warn based on every piece of information [available] .... Moreover,
both common sense and experience suggest that if every report of a
possible risk, no matter how speculative, conjectural, or tentative, im-
posed an affirmative duty to give some warning, a manufacturer would
1468 [Vol. 24:1437
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The FDCA and its implementing regulations ensure that the
FDA ultimately controls the presentation and content of risk infor-
mation. In some circumstances, the FDA will prevent manufactur-
ers from issuing a warning where the agency believes that the
scientific evidence does not warrant a warning."' 8 Certainly in
cases where the FDA has acted to prevent a proposed warning or
labeling change, tort law should not attempt to co-regulate
through damage awards. Once the FDA has made a determination
about proposed pharmaceutical labeling, it would be a violation of
federal law for the manufacturer to attempt to deviate from that
judgment. 119 Because the FDA should have the primary responsi-
bility for determining appropriate labeling, there can be little util-
ity in permitting a tort system to impose liability on a company for
complying with that judgment.1 20
be required to inundate physicians indiscriminately with notice of any
and every hint of danger, thereby inevitably diluting the force of any
specific warning given.
677 P.2d 1147, 1153 (Cal. 1984) (citations omitted). See Dunn v. Lederle Lab., 328
N.W.2d 576, 581 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing that warnings must be selective
to be effective and that excessive warnings might dissuade physicians from reading
them).
118 The FDA rarely directs manufacturers not to include a warning without good
reason. In particular, preliminary information poses two types of risk of error: false
positives and false negatives. A "false positive" occurs when preliminary information
seems to indicate that a warning about a side effect is appropriate, but later, more
complete information shows that the drug did not cause the side effect. A "false nega-
tive" occurs when preliminary information tends to show that a warning about a side
effect would be inappropriate, but later, more complete information shows that a
warning should be given.
The FDA, of course, has institutional incentives to err on the side of caution.
When a warning is given about a side effect and that warning turns out to be wrong,
only the medical community and the manufacturer are angered. Prescribing habits
may have been erroneously changed, but there are no visible victims. On the other
hand, if the FDA has preliminary information and fails to require or approve a warn-
ing and the harm ensues, the agency makes news.
119 A new drug not labeled in accordance with an approved NDA is misbranded. 21
U.S.C. § 352(f)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1993); 21 C.F.R § 201.100(c) (1993). A mis-
branded drug is subject to seizure, 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993), and the
manufacturer becomes subject to criminal penalties. 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1993).
120 Obviously, the FDA's policy of maintaining the brevity of package inserts comes
at a price. In particular, at the margin, the agency may in some instances exclude
information that is more valuable than the costs of keeping the information from the
package insert. If, however, the package insert is to retain its current role, it cannot
become a treatise: "[t]here are very few statements in prescription drug labeling on
which some controversy could not be found within the medical profession .... To
permit or require statements of conflicting opinion on all of these matters would
destroy the present usefulness of prescription drug labeling." 39 Fed. Reg. 33,229,
33,232 (1974); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1.21 (1993) (prohibiting "statement[s] of differ-
ences of opinion with respect to warnings").
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b. Design Defect Litigation and Vaccines
While labeling issues predominate pharmaceutical cases, there
are some tort actions that challenge a drug product's design. In
doing so, these tort actions collide with the FDA's risk-benefitjudg-
ment that a particular drug should be marketed. The design de-
fect challenges raised in DPT litigation 121 of the 1980s best
exemplify this clash of the federal regulatory and state tort law sys-
tems. In the case of the DPT vaccine, this clash led to liability be-
ing imposed on manufacturers through design defect theories,
even though the FDA had determined that the risks of the DPT
vaccine were clearly and substantially outweighed by the vaccine's
benefits.122 Although many courts invoked the strict liability ra-
The package insert is only part of the medical education system and is not partic-
ularly well-suited for communicating uncertain, preliminary scientific information. In
other words, although doctors rely extensively on the package insert, they can also
consult other authorities. Indeed, in a world undergoing an information revolution,
the role of the package insert undoubtedly is diminishing and will continue to
diminish.
121 DPT litigation arose in response to preliminary medical reports in the early
1980s suggesting that the pertussis component of the three-in-one "whole cell" vac-
cine for diptheria, tetanus and pertussis ("DPT") was responsible for as many as 25
annual serious adverse reactions including brain damage and occasional death. At
that time, no other vaccine was licensed-proven to be safe and efficacious-for use
in the United States. Because no better alternative to the whole cell vaccine had been
identified, the benefits to using the vaccine substantially outweigh the vaccine's po-
tential risks. Indeed, the current science suggests that the safety concerns of the early
1980s were overstated. SeeJames D. Cherry, 'Pertussis Vaccine Encephalopathy" It Is Time
to Recognize It as the Myth That It Is, 263 JAMA 1679 (1990); Vincent A. Fulginiti, A
Pertussis Vaccine Myth Dies, 144 AM. J. DIsEAsEs OF CHILDREN 860-61 (1990); Kim R.
Wentz & Edgar K Marcuse, Diptheria-Tetanus-Pertussis Vaccine and Serious Neurologic Ill-
ness: An Updated Review of the Epidemiologic Evidence, 87 PEDIATRICS 287 (1991).
122 The cases involved similar benefits verses similar risks-for example, the risk of
vaccine-induced whooping cough as opposed to contracting the illness because of
non-vaccination. In the early 1900s, pertussis was a leading cause of death in children
in the United States. In 1934, when the United States suffered its worst pertussis
epidemic, there were 265,000 reported cases of pertussis that year, and 7,500 related
deaths. By the early 1940s, pertussis was responsible for two and one-half times the
number of deaths of all of the following childhood diseases combined: measles,
mumps, rubella, diphtheria, polio, meningitis, chicken pox, and scarlet fever. Alan R.
Hinman &Jeffrey P. Koplan, Pertussis and Pertussis Vaccine: Re-Analysis of Benefits, Risks,
and Costs, 251 JAMA 3109 (1984). From 1943 to 1976, the United States showed a
99% decrease in the reported cases of pertussis per 100,000, and an even more dra-
matic reduction in the number of deaths. James D. Cherry, The Epidemiology of Pertus-
sis and Pertussis Immunization in the United Kingdom and the United States: A Comparative
Study, 14 CURRENT PROBLEMS IN PEDIATRICS 7, 19, 33 (1983). In the absence of a per-
tussis vaccination program, the Centers for Disease Control estimates that there
would be approximately 322,000 additional cases of whooping cough per year, with
450 annual deaths. See generally Hinman & Koplan, supra, at 3113.
Where there are such direct tradeoffs, it is hard to see how the presence or lack
of a warning will affect individual behavior. In particular, given the identical adverse
1470
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tionale that the imposition of liability would encourage a safer vac-
cine, the prospect of multi-million dollar verdicts instead induced
manufacturers to abandon the vaccine market altogether.123
In response to the wave of litigation against vaccines, the
number of vaccine manufacturers has shrunk by over fifty percent
since 1968.124 Many vaccines, including those for polio, rubella,
measles, mumps, and rabies are currently provided by a single com-
pany. Thus, the effect of the court awards has been to create in-
centives for a monopoly.1 25 Moreover, many pediatric vaccines are
produced by a single supplier.1 26 The effect of litigation and con-
consequences, so long as the ex ante risk of the vaccine is lower than not being vacci-
nated, all will categorically prefer to be vaccinated. Thus, where risks are directly
comparable and exposure to the drug is the only rational choice, a failure to warn will
not be the cause of injury. Basing liability on a failure to warn or inadequate warning
will not rationalize the use of vaccines.
In contrast, where the risks of treatment and the risks of disease are not compara-
ble, individual autonomy must be respected. Therefore, where the tradeoffs are not
readily comparable, the patient should make the treatment decisions based on his or
her own values:
If, however, a drug poses a very small risk of fatal reaction and promises
general relief from the discomfort of a non-fatal disease, such as arthri-
tis, or relieves only the symptoms rather than the cause of a serious ill-
ness, risks and benefits are comparable....
Such measurement problems may prevent FDA from reaching cate-
gorical risk-benefitjudgment[s].
Richard A. Merrill, Risk-Benefit Decisionmaking by the Food and Drug Administration, 45
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 994, 1008 (1977).
123 See Peggy J. Naile, Note, Tort Liability for DPT Vaccine Injury and the Preemption
Doctrine, 22 IND. L. REv. 655, 703 (1989) (explaining that large damages awards "are
... likely to induce manufacturers to abandon the vaccine market altogether").
124 See generally AMA Board of Trustees, Impact of Product Liability on the Development
of New Medical Technologies, 137 PROC. HOUSE OF DELEGATES 79-91 (1988) [hereinafter
AMA Board]. In addition, foreign manufacturers are reluctant to enter the United
States market because of liability concerns. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, VACCINE
SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 11 (1985) ("Increasingly, the liability situation and its conse-
quences . . . have been cited [by pharmaceutical companies] as major factors in the
decision to withdraw [from the vaccine market].").
125 The economic incentives arose because all firms are not equally capable of bear-
ing risk and uncertainty. Smaller firms could neither self-insure nor purchase insur-
ance at affordable rates. Indeed, even the insurance companies were not eager or
able to bear the risk: "The presumption in the courts has been that insurance will
solve everything. But it hasn't, because insurance companies are no more eager to
lose their shirts to unpredictably generous juries than are the vaccine manufacturers
themselves." Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Manage-
ment in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 287 (1985).
In a climate of legal uncertainty, even if the adverse reactions are in and of them-
selves predictable, the liability consequences are not. Uncertainty, as opposed to risk,
is very difficult, if not impossible to insure. In other words, tort cannot act simply as
insurer in the pharmaceutical context unless both damages and liability rules are rela-
tively certain.
126 See generally Vaccine Injuy Compensation: Hearing on H.R. 1780, H.R. 4777, and
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comitant market concentration has led to an extraordinary rise in
vaccine prices, with increases far in excess of the inflation rate.127
There is no evidence that public health in the United States has
benefitted from the DPT vaccine litigation. 28 To the contrary, the
increasing cost of vaccines is a factor in the declining immuniza-
HR. 5184 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1986), at 7 (assessing the precipitous decline in
the number of vaccine manufacturers in the United States).
127 AMA Board, supra note 124, at 7. See also Gina Kolata, Litigation Causes Huge
Price Increases in Childhood Vaccines, 232 SCIENCE 1339 (1986) (the price of DPT went
from II& in 1982 to $11.40 in 1986; $8.00 of the increase went towards products
liability insurance).
128 As noted, American products liability law produced exit from the market, not
product improvement. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text. The only new
pertussis vaccine, an acellular version, was developed in Japan. Currently, it is uncer-
tain whether the new vaccine is preferable to the whole-cell vaccine. In any event, a
severe loss ofJapanese public confidence in the DPT whole-cell vaccine, which lead to
widespread failure to vaccinate, not product liability concerns, led to development of
the new vaccine.
Specifically, the Japanese determination to develop a new vaccine was the result
of a public health decision that led to disaster. Japanese health authorities temporar-
ily suspended the use of whole-cell DPT vaccine in the winter of 1974-75 after the
death of two infants following immunization. Pease v. American Cyanamid Co., 795
F. Supp. 755, 757 (D. Md. 1992). The suspension was quickly lifted, but usage of the
DPT vaccine swiftly declined and the incidence of whooping cough climbed to epi-
demic levels. Id. In 1979, 13,092 cases were reported in Japan, leading to 41 deaths.
See generally Koomi Kanai, Japan's Experience in Pertussis Epidemiology and Vaccination in
the Past Thirty Years, 33JAPAN J. MED. Sci. BioLoGy 107, 109 (1980). After the Japanese
government funded the development of a new pertussis vaccine, the acellular vaccine
was introduced in Japan in October 1982. Pease, 795 F. Supp. at 757.
At the time that the new vaccine was introduced, there had been little pre-mar-
keting testing. Id. Very little was known about the safety and efficacy of the new
vaccine. Id. Given the dearth of information, especially about efficacy, the FDA did
not approve the Japanese acellular pertussis vaccine until 1991. Id. The concerns
about efficacy have not been entirely resolved and the only approved indication is for
infants two years and above, who are at less risk of dying from pertussis than newborns
and younger infants. Id.
The rapid introduction of the acellular vaccine in Japan is instructive because it
may ultimately demonstrate that there can be public health costs to the FDA's
premarket approval process and litigation. In particular, the whole-cell DPT vaccine
was known to be efficacious, but was also implicated in severe, but rare, adverse reac-
tions. Given the apparent rarity of these reactions, it literally would take the adminis-
tration of millions of doses of a new vaccine to prove that the vaccine produced a
better safety profile than whole-cell DPT. It is, of course, not feasible to conduct such
large scale clinical trials in the United States for an alternative pertussis vaccine. At
the time DPT was first being used, there simply were not enough persons who were
not being vaccinated by the whole-cell vaccine to create such a pool. In addition,
liability concerns would create another substantial disincentive: if the new vaccine
were not as safe and efficacious as the whole-cell vaccine, the innovator could face
lawsuits. Over-deterrence can, in fact, harm public health.
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tion rates in the United States. 129
c. The Regulatoy Consequences of Systemic Error in the Tort
System
Litigation based on failure to warn or design defect theories
has a profound regulatory effect even where the product does not
cause injury. In particular, under the current tort system, judges'
and juries' abilities to make appropriate decisions is suspect in the
face of conflicting scientific evidence. 3 ° The saga of the Bendec-
tin litigation illustrates this problem.
Bendectin was an anti-nausea drug frequently prescribed for
morning sickness from 1957 to 1983.131 In 1956, the FDA ap-
proved Bendectin for combatting morning sickness and that ap-
proval remains in effect. 132 Despite the FDA's judgment that the
129 Sara Rosenbaum, Rationing Without Justice: Children and the American Health Sys-
tem, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1859, 1867-68 (1992).
130 The paradox of admitting expert testimony because it involves matters beyond
the understanding of the ordinary person, and then asking that same ordinary person
to evaluate the proffered information, has long been recognized. In fact, Learned
Hand noted at the turn of the century that "logically the expert is an anomaly...
[and] from the legal anomaly serious practical difficulties arise." Learned Hand, His-
torical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARv. L. REV. 40, 50
(1902). Hand succinctly described the paradox:
The whole object of the expert is to tell the jury .. .general truths
derived from his specialized experience. But how can the jury judge
between two statements each founded upon an experience confessedly
foreign in kind to their own? It is just because they are incompetent for
such a task that the expert is necessary at all.
[W]hen any conflict between really contradictory propositions arises, or
any reconciliation between seemingly contradictory propositions is nec-
essary, the jury is not a competent tribunal.
Theirs is not, and in the nature of things cannot be, the function to
decide between two sets of such truths ....
One thing is certain, they will do no better with the so-called testimony
of experts than without, except where it is unanimous. If the jury must
decide between such they are as badly off as if they had none to help.
The present system in the vast majority of cases-there being some dis-
pute upon almost all subjects of human inquiry-is a practical closing of
the doors of justice upon the use of specialized and scientific
knowledge.
Id. at 54-56. Consequently, Hand concluded that when the conflict between the ex-
perts is direct and open, "the absurdity of our present system is apparent." Id. at 54.
131 See Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(30 million pregnant women used Bendectin between 1957 and 1983), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 882 (1989).
132 Id. at 824.
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drug is safe to the unborn child, 3' and despite the fact that no jury
finding that Bendectin caused birth defects has ever been sus-
tained, Bendectin has been withdrawn from the market. The costs
of lawsuits and the risk of litigation error literally drove this prod-
uct from the market. 34
If the only adverse effect of Bendectin litigation was Bendec-
tin's removal from the market by its manufacturer, the price might
arguably be acceptable. 3 5 The real problem, however, is that if a
court of law can find Bendectin capable of causing birth defects,
any substance which is used by pregnant women, regardless of its
safety, presents a real litigation risk to a pharmaceutical manufac-
turer.'3 6 Thus, when a company has the choice of developing ther-
apies for use by pregnant women or pediatric patients, or to devote
its efforts to a less risky enterprise, there is a substantial financial
incentive to invest in a therapeutic area that poses less of a litiga-
133 The scientific community concurs in this judgment. See, e.g., Turpin v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1353-56 (6th Cir. 1992) (describing 35
epidemiological studies which concluded that Bendectin did not cause birth defects);
Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 893 F.2d 1149, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 1990)
(sustaining verdict for the manufacturer based, inter alia, on approximately 40 epide-
miological studies showing that Bendectin did not cause birth defects).
134 Despite the generally accepted belief among scientists that Bendectin does not
produce birth defects, plaintiffs have received favorable verdicts in approximately
36% of the cases that go to trial. The absence ofjury-decision reliability arises from a
combination of factors, including jurors' inability to distinguish good science from
bad science. Part of this is due to the inherent limits ofjurors, who, after all, are not
scientists. Poor cross-examination of "hired gun" experts is also inevitable inasmuch
as litigating a pharmaceutical case tests counsels' scientific training and lawyering
skills to the utmost. See generally Joseph Sanders, Jury Deliberation in a Complex Case:
Havner v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 16JusT. Sys. J. 45 (1993) (assessing juries'
performance in Bendectin case when plaintiff obtained a substantial verdict); Joseph
Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 301 (1992) (exploring the rapid decline in the rate of plaintiff success in
Bendectin lawsuits).
135 Such a price would, however, be acceptable only if the tort system was less prone
to error than the FDA. If that were the case, Bendectin's loss would be counterbal-
anced by systematically more accurate deterrence of risk. The appropriate question is
not whether the FDA or the tort system is perfect-neither are-but rather which is
better. Society is better protected if the more reliable and accurate decisionmaker, in
this case the FDA which has full and complete risk data, has the final say.
136 Chance alone dictates that children with birth defects will be born:
If 40 per cent of women are taking a particular medicine during preg-
nancy, then you would expect an average of 40 per cent of women who
have babies with a particular birth defect to have also been receiving
that medication during pregnancy. For this reason, almost every com-
monly used medicine has at some time been a suspected cause of birth
defects.
DAVID W. SMrrH, MOTHERING YOUR UNBORN BABY 61 (1979).
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tion risk.1 3 7
In short, laissez faire pharmaceutical litigation often creates
perverse incentives. These incentive effects can lessen the value or
even countermand the judgments of the FDA, thereby overturning
the agency's well-considered risk-benefit assessments. Because a
fully informed FDA almost certainly makes erroneous risk-benefit
judgments less often than our tort system, the role of tort law in
this context needs to be refocused.
IV. THE NEED FOR NATIONAL STANDARDS IN
PHARMACEUTICAL LITIGATION
State tort reform efforts in recent years have produced some
enhanced recognition of the regulatory compliance defense. Un-
fortunately, few, if any, states have reviewed regulatory schemes on
an individualized basis. Rather, the states have adopted one rule
that applies to all regulatory schemes regardless of whether the reg-
ulations have set appropriate safety standards for particular prod-
ucts. As noted, economic analysis shows that regulatory schemes
should be subject to individualized treatment, not the broad brush
currently in vogue with tort reformers.13 8 Consequently, in most
cases, the distinct issues presented by pharmaceuticals have not
been addressed by legislation relating to compensatory damages.1 39
137 Louis Lasagna, The Chilling Effect of Product Liability Development, in THE LIABILITY
MAZE: THE IMPACT Or LIABILITY LAw ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 334, 335-37 (Peter W.
Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL & INsTrrTE OF
MEDICINE, DEVELOPING NEw CONTRACEPTIvES 141 (1990) (unpredictable nature of liti-
gation is a significant disincentive for fertility research and development); AMA
Board, supra note 24, at 79 ("Innovative new products are not being developed or are
being withheld from the market because of liability concerns .... Certain older
technologies have been removed from the market, not because of sound scientific
evidence indicating lack of safety or efficacy but because product liability suits have
exposed manufacturers to unacceptable financial risks.").
138 In the late 1970s, the Carter administration determined that federal legislation
addressing products liability law was not appropriate, but that there was a need for
greater uniformity in the law. The administration caused the Commerce Department
to publish the Model Uniform Products Liability Act ("MUPLA") for voluntary use by
the states. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979). The MUPLA provided that products comply-
ing with government regulations were presumed to be non-defective, but that the
claimant could overcome that presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
at 62,730. Although state reform efforts can generally be traced to the MUPLA, the
resulting legislation was anything but uniform.
139 The New Jersey Legislature has, however, addressed compensatory damages.
See supra note 110 for a discussion of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 1987). Signifi-
candy, even though N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 may provide pharmaceutical manufac-
turers some measure of protection from labeling claims, the statute may not be given
a broad reading by the New Jersey Supreme Court inasmuch as the court apparently
subscribes to the notion "that state-tort claims advance a substantial goal apart from
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A few states have specifically focused on pharmaceuticals and
punitive damages and statutorily provide an FDA regulatory com-
pliance defense against such damages. 140  While these reform
measures are to be encouraged, their effect should not be over-
stated.14 1 Thus, except for some progress being made on the puni-
regulating behavior: to provide compensation to those injured by deleterious prod-
ucts when that result is consistent with public policy." Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 121 N.J. 69, 90-91, 577 A.2d 1239, 1249 (1990) (citations omitted).
140 The five states that have proscribed punitive damages where the manufacturer
has complied with the FDCA are: Arizona, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-701 (West
1992); NewJersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5(c) (West 1987); Ohio, OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2307.80(c) (Anderson 1991); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. § 30.927 (1993); and
Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2 (Michie 1992).
141 The award of punitive damages against pharmaceutical companies who have
complied with the FDCA is quite rare. See Product Liability Government Standards Defense
Proposal, 53 F-D-C RIE. (The Pink Sheet), Sept. 23, 1991, at 6 (quoting Northeastern
University Law Professor Michael Rustad) ("Since almost all the [punitive damages]
drug cases we studied involved either fraudulent test results, suppression of negative
impacts or withholding information from the Food and Drug Administration, compli-
ance with the government standard provisions in S 640 will have little impact."); I
Reporters' Study, supra at note 68, at 232 (noting that news stories have fueled an
erroneous general perception that punitive damages are commonly rendered in tort
cases).
Even though punitive damages are only a small part of the problem-the real
problem is the unregulated award of compensatory damages-the availability of puni-
tive damages undoubtedly has untoward effects on the course of pharmaceutical liti-
gation. According to some commentators:
The mere presence of punitive damage counts has an undesirable effect
on the course of drug product liability litigation. As is true for punitive
damage claims involving other products, these counts are only rarely
dismissed on summary judgment .... Punitive damage claims, there-
fore, have caused substantial increases in settlement and litigation costs
for pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Kuhlik & Kingham, supra note 31, at 697. This effect alone warrants preclusion of
punitive damages where there has been regulatory compliance.
In addition, the total absence of control over punitive damages has led to the
potential for enormous liability where the manufacturer has acted in a socially re-
sponsible manner. The Depo-Medrol case in Chicago, Proctor v. Michaelj. Davis, M.D.
& Upjohn Co., No. 84 L 3213 (Il1., Cook Cty. Cir. Ct. Oct. 18, 1991) is perhaps the
most notorious example of such a case. Depo-Medrol is an injectable anti-inflam-
matory drug whose directions for use call for intramuscular injection, usually the glu-
teal muscle. When Upjohn became aware that the product was being used by
physicians near the eye, it petitioned the FDA to warn against this improper use. The
agency, however, in 1981, refused to permit the inclusion of the proposed labeling.
Nonetheless, physicians continued to misuse Depo-Medrol, and as a result, the plain-
tiff lost an eye. A Chicago jury awarded the plaintiff $3.1 million in compensatory
damages and $124.6 million in punitive damages. At trial, the court refused to allow
evidence that the FDA had rejected Upjohn's application to add a warning about this
misuse.
After the verdict, the trial court remitted the punitive damages to $35 million.
Upjohn then appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court. Oral argument was heard on
November 18, 1993, and a decision is pending. Telephone Interview with Andrew L.
Frey, Esq., Counsel for Upjohn (Mar. 23, 1994).
HeinOnline  -- 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1476 1993-1994
1994] DETERRING INEFFICIENT LITIGATION 1477
tive damages issue, 142 state legislative efforts do not appear to have
significantly reduced litigation uncertainty for pharmaceutical
manufacturers.
Indeed, courts throughout the fifty states still answer the same
liability questions differently.1 43 By the same token, commentators
have persuasively argued that the answers to fundamental tort is-
sues change over time within single jurisdictions. 44 Consequently,
piecemeal legislative reform at the state level will not produce uni-
form results when looking at these regulatory schemes. 4 5 Since
there is a genuine need for national standards in pharmaceutical
litigation, federal legislation addressing the specific issues
presented by pharmaceuticals must be considered. 146
In the Depo-Medrol case, the manufacturer did nothing wrong, let alone substan-
tially or intentionally depart from appropriate safety norms. Unfortunately, the jury
never knew why Upjohn failed to warn or the FDA policy rationale which led the
agency to prohibit the warning. See generallyJoseph A. Mahoney, Note, Senate Bill 640:
Proposed Federal Product Liability Reform and Its Potential Effect on Pharmaceutical Cases and
Punitive Damages Claims, 36 ST. Louis U. LJ. 475, 475-77 (1992).
142 The current products liability reform bill before Congress contains a categorical
exclusion of punitive damages for FDA-approved drugs, which is overturned if the
manufacturer withheld safety data, explicitly including DERs, or bribed FDA officials.
Product Liability Fairness Act of 1993, S. 687, 103d Cong., 1st. Sess. § 203(b) (1993).
Its immediate predecessors, S. 640, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), the Product Liability
Fairness Act of 1991, and the Fairness in Product Liability Act of 1991, H.R. 3030,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1991, also barred punitive damages against FDA-approved
pharmaceuticals except where the manufacturer withheld safety data from the agency
or bribed FDA officials. The legislation failed to become law because there were in-
sufficient votes to close the Senate debate. Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 995
(Sept. 11, 1992). For a full description of S. 640, see Robert A. Goodman, Proposed
Federal Standards For Product Liability, 30 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 253 (1993); S. Rep. No.
215, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
Prior to the 1991 and 1993 bills, the Uniform Product Safety Act of 1988, H.
1115, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., § 207(d)(1) (1988) contained a similar provision.
143 See Naile, supra note 123, at 673 n.122 (noting the inconsistent treatment of
identical issues in DPT litigation).
144 See J. Clark Kelso, One Lesson From the Six Monsanto Lectures on Tort Reform and
Jurisprudence: Recognizing the Limits of Judicial Competence, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 765
(1992). According to Professor Kelso:
The fact that the law in ajurisdiction can be easily stated at any particu-
lar moment in time is not, however, the test of a well-functioning judi-
cial system. The proper question-and the minimum requirement-is
whether the substantive law remains relatively stable .... This is where
products liability has failed. The Supreme Court of California, for ex-
ample, has changed the law in products cases every ten or fifteen years.
Id. at 780 n.63.
145 Cf id. at 780-81 (" [T]he cases around the country are hopelessly in conflict con-
cerning even the most basic issues .... [T] he court-made expansions have at least
partly contributed to a perceived crisis and legislative response which undermines
public confidence in the judiciary and creates its own social problems.").
146 Several commentators have made similar suggestions. See, e.g., Note, supra note
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Such legislation must recognize that the FDCA does not estab-
lish minimum standards for prescription drug products or their la-
beling. Rather, where the FDA has applied its expertise under the
FDCA, courts should be prohibited from co-regulating
pharmaceuticals through the award of tort damages. Federal legis-
lation containing express preemptive language with regard to FDA
regulatory compliance should be adopted.
First, pharmaceutical design defect litigation should be pre-
empted in the absence of fraud on the FDA. In particular, where
the FDA has approved a pharmaceutical for marketing, the agency
has made an explicit judgment that the product will aid the public
health. This judgment should be respected absent fraud, i.e., the
provision of false information, the failure to include material safety
information in the NDA, or the failure to provide post-marketing
information which would have led to withdrawal of the product or
changes in the approved uses of the product. As we have shown,
the requirements for an NDA are so extensive that, at the margin,
the FDCA probably over-deters. In such a case, tort liability pro-
vides no additional societal benefits. It is only where pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers have provided false or misleading information
to the FDA that tort actions will play a legitimate regulatory role.
Second, legislation must recognize that the regulatory scheme
decreed by the FDCA ensures a reasoned decision by the FDA
about appropriate labeling information. Thus, once the manufac-
turer can show that the agency has exercised its judgment about
the sufficiency of a warning, this legislation should remove the pos-
sibility of co-regulation through tort liability. The preemptive legis-
lation, however, should be carefully drafted to ensure that the
agency has in fact affirmatively acted on accurate information pro-
vided by a manufacturer before the potentially powerful regulatory
effect of tort law is removed.'47
23, at 793 (concluding, in argument based on limited preemption, that courts should
review FDA determinations on administrative law standards); Dueffert, supra note 98,
at 223-24 (setting forth statutory language proposed by author for purpose of afford-
ing a "strong presumption of non-negligence for manufacturers such as those selling
FDA-approved drugs").
147 In the past decade, physicians have increasingly prescribed drugs for uses not
approved by the FDA-so called "off-label" uses. Off-label prescribing is believed to
be widespread, particularly in the treatment of cancer. William L. Christopher, Off-
Label Prescription: Filling the Regulatory Vacuum, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 248 (1993).
For example, a recent survey of prescribing practices by oncologists revealed that one-
third of prescriptions for cancer patients were for off-label uses. Thomas Laetz &
George Silberman, Reimbursement Policies Constrain the Practice of Oncology, 266 JAMA
2996, 2997 (1991). The same survey found that 56% of cancer patients were found to
have received at least one drug for an off-label purpose. Id.
1478 [Vol. 24:1437
HeinOnline  -- 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1478 1993-1994
DETERRING INEFFICIENT LITIGATION
In both the design and labeling situations, plaintiffs should be
permitted to establish that the FDA's judgments were obtained
through fraud or deceit. In order to ensure, however, that the reg-
ulatory compliance defense is not easily set aside, a plaintiff should
be obliged to satisfy the judge by a preponderance of the evidence
that fraud exists. Only if the judge finds in a separate pretrial hear-
ing that such evidence exists should the question of fraud be
presented to a jury.
Other FDA decisions about labeling are also entitled to pre-
emptive effect. Thus, in a situation where a manufacturer has peti-
tioned the FDA for a new warning, but the FDA has explicitly
prohibited the warning, tort liability is inappropriate and should
be preempted. 148 As noted elsewhere, because the FDA has institu-
tional incentives to adequately warn, a determination by the agency
that a warning is inappropriate generally will occur only in those
situations where the harm is speculative, or where serious issues of
dilution or brevity are presented in labeling.
Likewise, where the manufacturer has applied for a labeling
change and the FDA has approved it, the resulting labeling should
be regarded as adequate. Because the FDA has exercised its exper-
tise in its review, the agency has necessarily found that the pro-
posed language is appropriate to the risk by directing the
information to be placed in the package insert. Given the agency's
involvement in decisions reflecting the specific language ultimately
incorporated in such package inserts, further micro-management
of the labeling process through tort law will not result in system-
atic, beneficial changes.
In virtually all instances of off-label uses, the drug previously has been approved
by the FDA for other medical indications. Nevertheless, in the case of off-label uses,
the FDA has not had the opportunity to exercise its regulatory judgment as to
whether the drug is safe and effective for the use in question either because the phar-
maceutical manufacturer has not submitted a supplemental NDA, or a supplemental
NDA has been submitted but has not yet been approved by the agency. Obviously,
any legislation that preempts tort remedies based on regulatory compliance must take
into account these situations. Generally, in such circumstances a pharmaceutical
manufacturer should not be entitled to assert the regulatory compliance defense.
It also should be noted that pharmaceutical manufacturers are obligated to ad-
vise the FDA of adverse reactions where their drugs are being used for unapproved
indications. The agency may require the drug's labeling to warn of the risks posed by
off-label uses. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (1993). In such instances, the regulatory compli-
ance defense may be available.
148 These are not theoretical concerns, but rather have happened in New Jersey
and Kansas. See Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 681 P.2d 1038 (Kan.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374
(1984).
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V. CONCLUSION
The network of pharmaceutical regulations is more complex
and thorough than the safety regulations for any widely-marketed
consumer product. Before pharmaceutical products are marketed,
they must undergo extensive testing following clinical trials whose
results are reviewed by the FDA. Overall, no drug is marketed until
after the FDA makes a judgment that the benefits associated with
the product outweigh the product's risks. Because the standards
for safety applied by the FDA generally go beyond what is economi-
cally efficient, there is the strong presumption that meeting FDA
standards implies that an efficient level of safety is being provided,
based on the knowledge available at the time the drug is marketed.
In addition, the warnings language associated with such prod-
ucts must be approved by the FDA which, in practice, leads to sub-
stantial FDA involvement in the drafting of warnings language.
Labeling decisions should be made on a centralized basis so that
the language used has consistency and uniformity. In contrast, lais-
sez faire litigation creates perverse incentives that may both dilute
and overload the drug product labeling.
Tort law in the pharmaceutical context has proven to be an
extraordinarily expensive regime that suffers from institutional
constraints limiting its accuracy. The experiences with Bendectin
and especially DPT show that tort liability can create perverse in-
centives that actually harm social welfare. By the same token,
where the manufacturer has complied with the FDCA and its im-
plementing regulations, tort law does not appear to have signifi-
cant ability to generate safer drugs. In short, tort law's role should
be to ensure that pharmaceutical companies provide full and com-
plete disclosure to the FDA so that the agency can properly make
judgments necessary to protect the public health.
In the usual case where there has been regulatory compliance,
society's goal of promoting public health will have been achieved.
This is all that should be asked of the tort system. Litigation has
proven to be too expensive a mechanism to compensate injuries
unless deterrence of irresponsible conduct is simultaneously being
achieved.
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